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INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's 1892 decision in Illinois Central
Railroad Co. v. Illinois' is the foundation of the public trust
doctrine.2 Like Marbury v. Madison' on judicial review, it is next
to impossible to find a case or read an argument addressing the
public trust doctrine without prominent reference to Illinois
Central.4 Over the years, a number of commentators have argued
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1. 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (Illinois Central).
2. The public trust doctrine describes the state's fiduciary responsibilities with
respect to land under navigable water and certain associated resources. See
generally 4 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS § 30.02(a) (1996) (Robert E. Beck ed., 1996)
[hereinafter WATERS]. Originally limited to land under navigable water, the scope
of the doctrine has expanded in more recent years to include water appropriated from
navigable watercourses and recreational and ecological values associated with
navigable waters. See infra notes 186-87 (describing this expansion of the so-called
"trust resources"). In brief, under the trust doctrine, the state is said to hold title to
trust resources in trust for the public. Although the state may alienate trust
resources in fee in certain situations, see infra note 45, other grants of trust
resources are said to be subject to revocation by the state without payment of
compensation. This ability to circumvent the Fourteenth Amendment is the public
trust doctrine's promise or its peril, depending on one's perspective.
3. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
4. See Eric Pearson, Illinois Central and the Public Trust Doctrine in State Law,
15 VA. ENvTL. L.J. 713, 719-20 nn.38-40 (1996) (noting that as of Sept. 25, 1996, 218
state court cases had cited Illinois Central); WATERS, supra note 2, § 30.02(b)(1)
n. 140 (listing cases citing to Illinois Central as the seminal public trust decision).
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that Illinois Central's public trust doctrine, which allows states
to revoke prior grants of trust resources without paying just
compensation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments,5 is
analytically indefensible.6 It rests on a shaky historical founda-
tion.' It describes a trust relationship that does not fit general
principles of trust law.' And it is a common-law doctrine that
courts use to reverse legislative decisions, an anti-majoritarian
task generally reserved for state or federal constitutions.9
Notwithstanding its flaws, courts' use of the public trust doctrine
has continued to grow in the last thirty years,'0 due in no small
part to the skillful advocacy of the doctrine's supporters."
5. See supra note 2 (summarizing the public trust doctrine). The Fifth
Amendment's just compensation requirement has been applied to the states via the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See U.S. CONST. amends. V &
XIV; see also Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233-35 (1897)
(incorporating just compensation requirement).
6. I am among those commentators who have criticized the doctrine. See James
R. Rasband, The Disregarded Common Parentage of the Equal Footing and Public
Trust Doctrines, 32 LAND & WATER L. REV. 1 (1997) (reviewing historical origins of
public trust doctrine).
7. See infra notes 133-41 and accompanying text (discussing the dubious
historical origins and foundation of the public trust doctrine).
8. See James L. Huffman, A Fish out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a
Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVTL. L. 527, 534-45 (1989) (explaining how the
public trust doctrine differs from general principles of trust law).
9. The Supreme Court, quite correctly, has emphasized that the public trust
doctrine is a common-law doctrine that each state is free to adopt and adapt on its
own. See Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469, 475 (1988) ("[I]t has
been long established that the individual States have the authority to define the
limits of the lands held in public trust and to recognize private rights in such lands
as they see fit."); Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 395 (1926) (I[Tihe
conclusion reached [in Illinois Central] was necessarily a statement of Illinois law.").
In an effort to justify its anti-majoritarian impact, a number of commentators have
proposed locating the public trust doctrine in either state constitutions or in the U.S.
Constitution. See, e.g., Michael C. Blumm, Public Property and the Democratization
of Western Water Law: A Modern View of the Public Trust Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 573,
576-77 (1989) (inferring the public trust doctrine from state constitutional provisions
making water the property of the state); Michael C. Blumm & Thea Schwartz, Mono
Lake and the Evolving Public Trust in Western Water, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 701, 713-15
(1995) (discussing potential origins of trust doctrine); Charles F. Wilkinson, The
Headwaters of the Public Trust: Some Thoughts on the Source and Scope of the
Traditional Doctrine, 19 ENVTL. L. 425 (1989) (locating authority for the public trust
doctrine in the Commerce Clause).
10. See supra note 2 and infra notes 186-87 and accompanying text (describing
growth of public trust doctrine).
11. The proponents of the public trust doctrine are now legion but any list of its
most articulate advocates would have to include Professors Blumm, Dunning,
Johnson, Sax, and Wilkinson. For citations to some of their work and the work of
others, both supportive and critical, see infra note 18.
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Despite the attention lavished on Illinois Central and the
public trust doctrine, one aspect of Justice Field's majority
opinion has gone unexplored: his suggestion that where a state
resumes control over a previously granted trust resource, the
state "ought to pay" for any "expenses incurred in improvements
made under such a grant."'2 Although Justice Field's language
has been repeated without elucidation in three modern California
public trust doctrine cases,' 3 it has otherwise failed to draw
judicial notice. Field's compensation suggestion merits scrutiny,
however, because it suggests a potential point of compromise
between the public trust doctrine's critics and supporters, that is,
between those who view the public trust doctrine as a circumven-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of private
property and those who do not.' 4 Regardless of whether state
exercise of a public trust easement requires just compensation
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, it may merit some
compensation as a matter of equity. To paraphrase an old
maxim: a state which seeks equity must do equity.15
12. See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 455. In full, Justice Field stated:
"Undoubtedly there may be expenses incurred in improvements made under such a
grant, which the state ought to pay; but, be that as it may, the power to resume the
trust whenever the state judges best is, we think, incontrovertible." Id.
13. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 723 n.22 (Cal.
1983) (Mono Lake); California v. Superior Court, 625 P.2d 256 (Cal. 1981); City of
Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 374 (Cal. 1980); see also infra Part II.A.3
(discussing these cases).
14. Courts and commentators adopting the public trust doctrine of Illinois
Central have rejected the suggestion that the doctrine can work an unconstitutional
taking, asserting that a public trust servitude was necessarily imposed on any grant
and thus the exercise of that servitude takes nothing from the grantee. See, e.g.,
Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 721; Blumm, supra note 9 at 584-87; Ralph W. Johnson, The
Public Trust Doctrine and Coastal Zone Management in Washington State, 67 WASH.
L. REV. 521, 583-86 (1992). Other commentators have argued that an uncompen-
sated revocation of a grant of overflowed lands or associated resources can constitute
a taking. See, e.g., George A. Gould, The Public Trust Doctrine and Water Rights, 34
ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 25-1, 49 (1988); James L. Huffman, Avoiding the Takings
Clause Through the Myth of Public Rights: The Public Trust and Reserved Rights
Doctrines at Work, 3 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 171, 190-91 (1987).
15. This equitable maxim should not be taken so literally as to allow for
compensation only when the state pleads for equitable relief. Starting with New
York's 1848 adoption of the Field Code, continuing in other states, then with the
1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and finally in additional state courts, law and
equity were merged. See Donald L. Horowitz, Decreeing Organizational Change:
Judicial Supervision of Public Institutions, 1983 DUKE L.J. 1265, 1270; GEOFFREY
C. HAZARD, JR., CIL PROCEDURE § 1.6 (3d ed. 1985). See generally Jack B.
Weinstein, The Ghost of Process Past: The Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and Erie, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (1988). "Only four states, Arkansas,
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The project of Part I of the article is to explore potential
sources and rationales for Justice Field's suggestion that the state
ought to pay compensation for any improvements it takes or
destroys when it resumes control over a public trust resource.
This investigation exposes the broader foundations of the public
trust doctrine to renewed scrutiny. Specifically, it weakens the
argument upon which proponents of the doctrine have relied that
grantees of trust resources have always been on notice of the
state's public trust easement, and it buttresses the view that, if
a trust doctrine does exist, grants of trust resources are not void
but merely voidable. The investigation also lays the foundation
for the article's suggestion that if the public trust doctrine is to be
employed, it must include an equitable compensation obligation.
Two rationales emerge as possible justifications. First, the
compensation requirement can be viewed as an application of the
common-law equitable principle that good faith, mistaken
improvers should be compensated for the cost of their mistaken
improvements. Alternatively, the compensation requirement can
be viewed as part and parcel of the public trust doctrine itself, as
a constructive condition placed on the state's right to revoke a
grant of trust resources, which right is itself constructive.
Part I then discusses two potential obstacles to either
rationale. It addresses the potential tension between an equita-
ble compensation requirement and the no compensation rule of
the federal navigation servitude, and it responds to the question
whether requiring the state to pay equitable compensation runs
afoul of sovereign immunity. On this latter issue, the article
concludes that immunity problems can be overcome under either
rationale but that conceiving of compensation as a condition of
revocation more readily avoids the state's immunity because
compensation thereby becomes an element of the state's claim.
Having articulated a defensible rationale for the equitable
compensation principle of Illinois Central, Part II of the article
argues that the same principle should be applied in modern
public trust cases. Courts should begin awarding equitable
Delaware, Mississippi, and Tennessee, still have separate courts of equity." Morton
Gitelman, The Arkansas Courts: The Separation of Law and Equity and the Arkansas
Chancery Courts: Historical Anomalies and Political Realities, 17 U. ARK. LITTLE
ROCK L.J. 215, 244 (1995). Thus, although prior to the merger, equitable compen-
sation would only have been available if the state sought equitable relief, now the
relief the state seeks generally is no longer determinative.
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compensation either by way of equity or as a common-law
refinement to the public trust doctrine itself. The article con-
cludes by suggesting that states need not wait to see whether
their courts will properly exercise their equitable power or
properly interpret the public trust doctrine. They can and should
enact legislation providing for equitable compensation where the
state revokes or limits a previous grant of trust resources. 16
I. ILLINOIS CENTRAL AND THE POTENTIAL SOURCES OF
EQUITABLE COMPENSATION
A. The Illinois Central Case
Before addressing the origin and implications of the Court's
compensation suggestion in Illinois Central, this section of the
article reviews the Illinois Central case and the public trust
doctrine it articulated.17 The review is intended to set the context
for the exploration of the equitable compensation issue and
makes no effort at detailed exploration of the prior history and
16. It is important to recognize at the outset that the public trust doctrine is not
always used to revoke outright a prior grant of trust resources. Although that was
the approach in Illinois Central, in many other cases the doctrine is used to limit a
grantee's ability to use the full trust resource that she was actually granted. See,
e.g., Mono Lake, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983) (ordering reconsideration of Los Angeles'
original water right to the tributaries of Mono Lake); State v. Central Vt. Ry., 571
A.2d 1128 (Vt. 1989) (limiting railroad's ability to use submerged and filled lands of
Lake Champlain for anything other than railroad, wharf, or storage purposes), cert.
denied, 495 U.S. 931 (1990); Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393
N.E.2d 356, 366-67 (Mass. 1979) (prohibiting development of filled tidelands because
under public trust conveyance the tidelands could only be used for marine
commerce). See also Blumm, supra note 9, at 578 (surveying case law and describing
four different types of public trust remedies: "(1) a public easement guaranteeing
access to trust resources; (2) a restrictive servitude insulating public regulation of
private activities against constitutional takings claims; (3) a rule of statutory and
constitutional construction disfavoring terminations of the trust; and (4) a
requirement of reasoned administrative decision making") (footnotes omitted). This
article focuses on revocations of prior grants because it presents, in the clearest
conceptual framework, the public trust doctrine's ability to circumvent constitutional
takings protections and thus the need for equitable compensation. The equitable
compensation principle, however, also has application in those circumstances where
the grantee's rights in the trust resource are only limited and not entirely revoked
because the principle is not dependent upon a takings analysis. See infra note 260.
17. For two other overviews of the background of Illinois Central, see WATERS,
supra note 2, § 30.02(b)(1) and Pearson, supra note 4.
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development of 'the public trust doctrine about which so much has
already been written.'"
In 1869, the Illinois legislature passed, over the governor's
veto, what was commonly known as the Lake Front Act, granting
to the Illinois Central Railroad ("Railroad") "all the right and title
of the State of Illinois" to more than 1,000 acres of submerged
lands extending out from the City of Chicago under Lake Michi-
gan. 9 The alleged consideration for the grant of the submerged
lands was the Railroad's agreement to pay the State semi-
annually, and in perpetuity, seven percent of its gross earnings
derived from use of the submerged lands.2" Following the grant,
18. The literature on the public trust doctrine is vast. Since Professor Sax's
path-breaking article on the doctrine, Joseph L. Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine in
Natural Resource Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970),
a number of articles have been written. See, e.g., Blumm & Schwartz, supra note 9,
at 713; Richard J. Lazarus, Changing Conceptions of Property and Sovereignty in
Natural Resources: Questioning the Public Trust Doctrine, 71 IOWA L. REV. 631, 633-
34 (1986); Harrison C. Dunning, The Public Trust Doctrine and Western Water Law:
Discord or Harmony, 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 17-1 (1985); James L. Huffman,
Trusting the Public Interest to Judges: A Comment on the Public Trust Writing of
Professors Sax, Wilkinson, Dunning and Johnson, 63 DENV. U. L. REV. 565 (1986);
Symposium, The Public Trust Doctrine in Natural Resource Law and Management,
14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 181 (1980); Symposium, The Public Trust and the Waters of the
American West: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 19 ENVTL. L. 425 (1989). For
additional articles focusing on the history and development of the public trust
doctrine prior to Illinois Central, see infra note 134.
19. See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 405, 448, 454. The Lake Front Act also
confirmed in the Illinois Central Railroad title to certain lands previously filled by
the Railroad in exercise of its riparian rights. See Illinois v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co.,
33 F. 730, 772-73 (N.D. Ill. 1888) (discussing § 3 of the Act); 146 U.S. at 449-50
(same). The Act had several additional components which were not crucial to the
outcome of the case. Section 1 granted certain submerged lands to the City of
Chicago. Section 2 provided that the proceeds from the sale of those submerged
lands were to be set aside as a park fund for the City of Chicago. Section 3 granted
submerged lands to the Railroad and is the provision for which the case is typically
cited. Sections 4 through 6, in consideration for an $800,000 payment to the City of
Chicago, granted certain other submerged lands to Illinois Central and to three other
railroad companies and empowered the City of Chicago to quitclaim any rights it had
in those submerged lands. See 146 U.S. at 405 (quoting the Lake Front Act in full).
In the event, Chicago refused to quitclaim any of its interest and put the first
$200,000 payment by the railroads into escrow. See id. at 407-08.
20. See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 448-49. Whether the royalty provision
constituted consideration is doubtful. The Railroad was not bound to make any use
of the lands and "coild not have been called upon to pay such per centum until after
the lands were used and improved, and income derived therefrom." 146 U.S. at 461;
Illinois v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 33 F. at 773. Moreover, the Railroad was already
bound to make just such payments pursuant to its original charter. See Brief on
Behalf of the State of Illinois at 54, Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387
(1892). In return for this dubious consideration, the Railroad received lands that
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the Railroad began reclaiming portions of the submerged lands,
building slips, wharves, and piers.2' In 1873, Illinois passed
legislation repealing the 1869 Lake Front Act and revoking the
title of the Railroad to the submerged lands.22 Disputing the
repeal, the Railroad continued to build piers and assert owner-
ship of the harbor lands.23 Finally, in 1883, the State Attorney
General filed suit in state court, seeking a declaration of its title
to the disputed lands and an injunction requiring the Railroad to
remove its wharves and piers and enjoining it from constructing
others.24 Upon the Railroad's motion, the case was removed to
federal circuit court,25 where it stayed after the State's motion for
remand was rejected.26
some estimated to have had a value as high as $80,000,000, see THE RAILWAY AGE
AND NORTHWESTERN RAILROADER, Mar. 10, 1893, at 203, although that figure may
well have included the Lake Front Act's grant of lands in addition to the submerged
lands at issue in Illinois Central. See supra note 19 (discussing the other sections of
the Lake Front Act).
21. See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 446.
22. See id. at 410-11.
23. See id. at 410-13; see also Brief for Appellant at 29, Illinois Cent. R.R. Co.
v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) ("The improvements begun upon the granted lands
before the repeal and not then completed, were prosecuted to completion afterwards;
and between the date of the repealing Act and the commencement of this suit [in
1883] new works of considerable magnitude were undertaken and finished.").
24. See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 412, 433. The City of Chicago joined the
suit, agreeing with the State that the 1869 Act was void but arguing that it, not the
State, was the owner in fee of the disputed lands by virtue of prior grants. See id. at
412-14.
25. See Illinois v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 16 F. 881 (N.D. Ill. 1883) (discussing
removal under the Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470, which vested circuit
courts, for the first time, with general federal question jurisdiction and allowed
removal of cases arising under the Constitution or the laws of the United States).
Justice Harlan said removal was appropriate because the case presented the
following federal questions: whether Illinois had title to the submerged lands
according to Virginia's act of cession and the acts of Congress creating the Northwest
territory and admitting Illinois into the Union; whether the 1869 legislation
constituted a contract between the State and the Railroad and whether the 1873
repeal was an unconstitutional impairment of that contract; and whether the 1873
repeal was a taking without compensation prohibited by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. See id. at 886-87. It is unlikely that the modern federal judiciary would have
allowed removal of the case. In 1894, the Supreme Court ruled that a defendant
could remove a case only where the plaintiff relies on federal law for its claim. See
Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894) (construing Act of Mar.
3, 1887, ch. 373, 24 Stat. 552, corrected by Act of Aug. 13, 1888, 25 Stat. 433, both of
which were successor Acts to the removal provision of the Act of Mar. 3, 1875, 18
Stat. 470). In Illinois Central the primary federal questions were those relied on by
the defendant-whether the 1873 repeal violated the Contract Clause, the
Fourteenth Amendment, or both.
26. The removal to federal court and the subsequent adoption of the public trust
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Performing his circuit-riding duties in the northern district
of Illinois, Supreme Court Justice Harlan upheld the 1873 repeal
of the Lake Front Act." He did so, however, without reference to
the public trust doctrine that Justice Field and the Supreme
Court would subsequently adopt. Instead of suggesting that the
State's power to grant the submerged lands was limited by a trust
obligation that inhered in the state's title,2" Justice Harlan
interpreted the Lake Front Act as altering the Railroad's corpo-
rate charter so that it could act "as an agency of the state" in
doctrine by the Supreme Court should not be understood as supporting the project
of some public trust doctrine supporters of grounding the doctrine in federal law,
namely in the Constitution, so that its anti-majoritarian impact is legitimized. See
supra note 9 (citing such efforts). As discussed in note 25, supra, the federal
questions under the Contract Clause and Fourteenth Amendment were presented
in the Railroad's case and not as part of Illinois' public trust argument. Although the
federal question of Illinois' equal footing title was arguably also presented, there was
little question that Illinois and not the United States had title to the submerged
lands in question. See Illinois v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 16 F. at 886-87 (noting that
the federal questions on which the case "mainly depends" were raised by the
Railroad). If the question of equal footing title created a federal question, any
property dispute in the western United States would create a federal question, a
notion that has subsequently been rejected. See Wisconsin v. Baker, 698 F.2d 1323,
1327 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing numerous cases holding that the fact that "a right of
property was at one time governed by federal law or first conveyed by the United
States does not render a suit to enforce that right as one 'arising under' federal law"),
cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983). It is worth noting that the State itself argued that
no federal question was presented. Illinois v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 16 F. at 881
(rejecting State's argument against removal). Seemingly, if the State thought that
its right or obligation to repeal the 1869 grant was of constitutional origin, it would
not have been so quick to oppose removal. Chicago, in its briefing to the Supreme
Court also said that the validity of the Lake Front Act was not a constitutional
question. See Argument for the City of Chicago at 9, Illinois v. Illinois Cent. R.R.
Co.,146 U.S. 287 (1892). Whatever the scholarly debate, the Supreme Court has now
clearly located the public trust doctrine in state law. See supra note 9 (citing cases).
27. See Illinois v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 33 F. 730 (N.D. Ill. 1888). Under the
Judiciary Act of 1789, Supreme Court justices were obligated to "ride circuit" as
judges of the circuit courts, which enjoyed both original and appellate jurisdiction.
See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 1 (5th ed. 1994); ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 1.2 (1989). This continued in some form
until 1911 when circuit courts were finally eliminated and their original jurisdiction
was transferred to district courts. See WRIGHT, supra § 1. As discussed in note 25,
supra, the Act of March 3, 1875 vested circuit courts with original jurisdiction over
federal questions and allowed removal from state courts of cases presenting federal
questions. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, §§ 1-3, 18 Stat. 470, 470-471. This was an
expansion of the circuit courts' jurisdiction from the Judiciary Act of 1789 which gave
circuit courts original jurisdiction only in diversity cases, most criminal cases, and
larger cases to which the United States was a party. See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch.
20, §§ 9, 11-12, 1 Stat. 73, 77-79; see also WRIGHT, supra § 1.
28. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 455-60.
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accomplishing the public purpose of improving the harbor.29 To
Harlan, the 1873 legislation merely "revoked the license which
had been granted to the company to improve the harbor of
Chicago."3 Although Harlan cited no authority for his interpreta-
tion of the Lake Front Act, the basis of his reasoning is no
mystery. Until Illinois Central, there was little question that
states had power to grant submerged lands in fee as long as they
did so in clear and unequivocal language. 1 In those cases where
the granting language was susceptible to a different construction,
the rule was that the language should be interpreted in favor of
continued sovereign ownership." As Harlan presumably saw it,
the Lake Front Act did not unequivocally grant to the Railroad
fee title to the submerged lands; and because the Act was
susceptible to construction as only a license to act as a public
agency, that was how it should be construed.33 And because the
Act merely enlarged the powers of "an agency of the state, 34 the
submerged lands could be taken away without impairing a con-
tract or taking private property without just compensation.
Although Harlan perceived no Fourteenth Amendment
violation, he nevertheless addressed the question of compensa-
tion. Sending a mixed message, he first observed that if the
Railroad had made "extensive and costly improvements upon the
faith of the grant of the submerged lands,... the court would not
hesitate to hold that the company could not be deprived of the use
of any structures erected or improvements made upon these lands
...except upon compensation being made to it. 35 He then
pointed out, however, that only one "insignificant" part of the
submerged lands had been developed in reliance on the Lake
29. Illinois v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 33 F. at 772-73. At most, said Harlan, the
Railroad owned "a qualified fee" in the submerged lands for purposes of
accomplishing harbor improvements. Id.
30. Id. at 775.
31. See generally Rasband, supra note 6, at 14-17 & nn.51-52, 43 & n.171 (citing
a variety of cases and commentators reiterating the basic principle that even though
land under navigable water was prima facie in the sovereign, it was capable of
conveyance into private ownership by clear and express words).
32. See generally id.
33. One commentator has suggested that viewing the 1869 legislation as a
license is persuasive. See Pearson, supra note 4, at 735 (arguing that the Act's
prohibition against the Railroad alienating its fee interest in the lake bed and the
Act's requirement that the Railroad pay substantial sums to the state treasury in
perpetuity are contrary to an intention to grant a fee simple property interest).
34. Illinois v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 33 F. at 773.
35. Id. at 774.
19981
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Front Act, seemingly suggesting, although never stating, that the
breadth of reliance determined whether compensation was
appropriate and not simply its amount. 6 In the end, he ruled
that the 1873 repeal was not effective with respect to the small
part of submerged lands filled by the Railroad in reliance on the
Lake Front Act; the Railroad, he said, could continue to use and
hold that ground. Presumably, had the State wanted control of
this small parcel, it would have been required to compensate the
Railroad.
In extensive briefing before the Supreme Court, the parties, s
like Justice Harlan, emphasized a favorable interpretation of the
Lake Front Act over the public trust argument about Illinois'
power to pass or repeal the Act. The Railroad contended that the
unavoidable construction of the Act granted it fee title.39 The
State and the City of Chicago countered that the Act was properly
interpreted as a license which did not grant fee title but at most
a qualified title for accomplishing a public purpose." Although
36. See id. All the other reclaimed lands, said Harlan, had been developed by
virtue of the Railroad's riparian rights, pursuant to its charter, or with the consent
of Chicago. Id. Those lands, therefore, were not implicated by the repealing
legislation of 1873. See id. at 775. In its briefing before the Supreme Court, the
Railroad disputed Harlan's version of the facts, claiming that it had expended "more
than $200,000" on various improvements in reliance upon the Act prior to its repeal
in 1873. See Brief for Appellant at 28-29, Illinois v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S.
387 (1892). Presumably, the Railroad could have developed the submerged lands in
reliance on both the Lake Front Act and its riparian rights. The issue then became
one of characterization.
37. See Illinois v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 33 F. at 775-76.
38. Four briefs were filed in the Supreme Court. See Brief and Argument for
Appellant, Illinois Cent. R.R. Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892) (108 pages);
Argument for the City of Chicago (110 pages); Brief on Behalf of the State of Illinois
(170 pages); Brief for Appellant (146 pages).
39. See Brief for Appellant at 82-86.
40. See Brief on Behalf of the State of Illinois at 128 ("An analysis of the third
section of the Lake Front Act will show that it is susceptible of a construction which
makes it a license, and not an irrevocable grant or contract."); id. at 154-55
(discussing revocability of licenses); Argument for the City of Chicago at 90 ("[I]t is
plain that the railroad company did not take technically or substantially the fee to
the bed of Lake Michigan with the lines claimed. The grant was merely of use and
not of title."); id. at 77 ("[Tjhe principle uniformly adopted in the construction of
legislation of this character-that nothing passes by implication from the sovereign,
that nothing must be assumed against the State-should not be departed from, but
rather adhered to with intelligent firmness and scrupulous fidelity."); id. at 83-84
("The act did not create in the railroad company rights of private property in
derogation of the public right. It granted the company powers to be exercised,
subject to the public right .... "); see id. at 67-91 (making rule of construction
argument and citing cases).
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the parties did dispute Illinois' power to make the grant, that
argument was not the focus of the briefing. Instead, the argu-
ment of the State was rather apologetic in character, conceding
the paucity of authority but arguing that the case was without
precedent and necessitated a different result.
41
In a 4-3 decision,42 the Supreme Court adopted the public
trust doctrine in which the State itself had expressed so little
confidence. Writing for the majority, Justice Field apparently
accepted the Railroad's argument that the 1869 legislation was
an express grant of fee title to the Railroad because he focused on
the question of the State's power to make and repeal such a
grant.43 On that issue, he said that the State's title to lands
41. See id. at 130 ("[While there is much apparent authority favoring the power
[to grant these submerged lands], yet, as the case at bar is without precedent in
many of its aspects, the matter as we maintain is by no means free from doubt.").
Chicago's brief more aggressively argued that the State did not have power to convey
fee title to the submerged lands. Argument for the City of Chicago at 42-67. But its
focus was on the inability of the State to destroy the public right of navigation and
commerce by virtue of the Commerce Clause, an issue not implicated by the Lake
Front Act which prohibited the Railroad from interfering with navigation which was
in aid of commerce. In the end, Chicago did not think the Court even needed to
address Illinois' power. See id. at 83-84 ("The act did not create in the railroad
company rights of private property in derogation of the public right. It granted the
company powers to be exercised, subject to the public right .... Whether, had such
an attempt been made, its validity could have been sustained, is a question which,
happily, it is not necessary for this court to consider."). Interestingly, the Railroad
devoted only two out of 146 pages to the issue. Brief for Appellant at 111-12.
Apparently the Railroad was confident that the Court would follow the long-standing
rule that a state had power to grant land under navigable water as long as it did so
in clear and unequivocal language. Its confidence was no doubt aided by the fact
that in its amended information Illinois had claimed that quieting title in the
Railroad would do "great and irreparable injury to the State of Illinois as a proprietor
and owner of the bed of the lake, throwing doubts and clouds upon its title thereto,
and preventing an advantageous sale or other disposition thereof." Id. at 111
(emphasis added).
42. Justice Field's majority opinion was joined by Justices Lamar, Brewer, and
Harlan. Justice Shiras dissented and was joined by Justices Gray and Brown. Chief
Justice Fuller and Justice Blatchford did not participate in deciding the case. The
Chief Justice had been of counsel in the court below and Justice Blatchford was a
stockholder in the Illinois Central Railroad Company. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at
464-65, 476; see also 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES
HISTORY 756 app. at 761-62 (1926).
43. See 146 U.S. at 448-60. Toward the end of his opinion, Justice Field did add
a paragraph observing that the circuit court had treated the Lake Front Act as a
license. Id. at 460-62. If the Act created a license, said Field, the right of the State
"to cancel the [Railroad's] agency and revoke its power is unquestionable." Id. at
462. This paragraph could be viewed as an alternative holding that the Lake Front
Act never granted fee title, but if that is the case, its placement in the opinion is
strange. Logically, before adopting the public trust doctrine, Field's first question
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under navigable waters could not be sold and conveyed in the
same manner as its title to fast lands because the former had
always been held by the State in trust for the people for purposes
of navigation, commerce, and fishing. 4 As trustee, the State
could only grant away land beneath navigable water in certain
limited circumstances; 45 otherwise such grants were "necessarily
revocable., 4' And the 1869 grant, said Field, was certainly not of
the permissible variety. To Field, the conveyance to the Railroad
of the vast Chicago harbor was "a gross perversion of the trust"4
and a "proposition that cannot be defended. 4 s Concluding that
the legislature's 1873 repeal of the 1869 grant was an appropriate
exercise of its trust responsibilities and neither a taking under
the Fourteenth Amendment nor an impairment of a valid
contract, he quieted title in Illinois to the submerged lands in the
harbor.49 Thus was born the public trust doctrine.
Although by quieting title in Illinois Field furnished Illinois
with the primary equitable remedy it sought, he, like Justice
Harlan in the circuit court,5" observed that "[u]ndoubtedly there
may be expenses incurred in improvements made under such a
grant which the State ought to pay."'" Again, like Harlan, he
would have been whether the Lake Front Act even granted the Railroad title to the
submerged lands. To the extent the Act did not grant title, there would have been
no need to proceed to the public trust question. Thus, Field's reliance on the public
trust doctrine suggests he did not accept the view of Chicago and the State that the
Act created a mere license.
44. See id. at 452.
45. Forced by vast precedent, Field conceded that grants of land under
navigable water had long been permissible. He distinguished those grants, however,
by suggesting that they fell within either of two exceptions to a general prohibition
on grants of land under navigable water. Specifically, the grants had been
acceptable because the parcel conveyed actually promoted the public's interest in
navigation, commerce, and fishing or did not substantially impair the public's
interest in the lands and waters remaining. See id. at 453, 455-56.
46. Id. at 455.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 454.
49. See id. at 463-64. The Court held that "the act of April 15, 1873, repealing
[the Lake Front Act] is valid and effective for the purpose of restoring to the State
the same control, dominion and ownership of said lands that it had prior to the
passage of [the Lake Front Act]." Id.
50. See Illinois v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 33 F. at 774; see also supra text
accompanying note 35.
51. 146 U.S. at 455. There is no indication that the Railroad sought or was
awarded compensation. There are a couple of reasons it may not have sought
compensation. First, Harlan had decided that it could continue to use the area it had
filled in reliance on the 1869 grant. Illinois v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 33 F. at 775-76.
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cited no authority for his suggestion that Illinois "ought to pay.""
Given Field's rejection of the Railroad's Contract Clause and
Fourteenth Amendment arguments, it is unlikely that he relied
on either constitutional provision to support his assertion.53 What
is plausible is that he relied on the principle of equitable compen-
sation. As explored in the next section, at the time Illinois
Central was decided, courts were awarding equitable compensa-
tion in a variety of circumstances.
Before embarking on an exploration of potential rationales
for Field's compensation suggestion, it is useful to recognize that
the venture is necessarily speculative because of Field's failure to
muster any citation or to offer any reasoning in support of a state
obligation to pay compensation for improvements. In fact, some
might contend that tracing the origins of Field's compensation
suggestion is altogether unnecessary, arguing that the suggestion
is mere hortatory dicta. After all, Field only stated that "there
may be expenses incurred in improvements made under such a
grant which the State ought to pay."54 The language could also be
read as referring not to Illinois but as dicta referring to states and
grantees of trust resources more generally, although that
Second, there was no need to receive compensation for those improvements it had
made pursuant to its common-law riparian rights because it retained those
improvements without reference to the 1869 grant. See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at
445-48. The common law traditionally gave a riparian the right to "wharf out" and
build piers, wharves, and other improvements on tidelands and submerged lands
adjacent to her property. See, e.g., Yates v. Milwaukee, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 497, 504
(1870). Thus, on remand, Field instructed the court below that if the Railroad's
existing piers did not interfere with navigation, the court was to confirm title to the
piers in the Railroad by virtue of its status as a riparian. See 146 U.S. at 464. If,
however, the piers interfered with navigation, the court, said Field, could order that
they be removed or that other proceedings be initiated in accordance with state law.
See id.; see also Illinois ex rel. Hunt v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 91 F. 955 (7th Cir.
1899) (deciding on remand that piers did not interfere with navigation), aff'd, 184
U.S. 77 (1902). Although Field's instruction that the piers could be abated may
appear to contradict his earlier instruction that the State "ought to pay" for such
improvements, it does not. The Lake Front Act itself prohibited any "obstructions
to the harbor" or anything that would "impair the public right of navigation." 146
U.S. at 405, 450. Thus, to the extent any pier had interfered with navigation it was
not an improvement "made under such a grant which the State ought to pay." Id. at
455.
52. See 146 U.S. at 455.
53. The only sense in which compensation for improvements could have a
constitutional basis is if that compensation is conceptualized as a portion of the
grantee's property right. This issue is discussed, infra, text accompanying notes 184-
85.
54. 146 U.S. at 455 (emphasis added).
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conclusion seems unlikely given the vigorous dispute in the
parties' briefs about the amount of the Railroad's investment in
reliance on the Lake Front Act.5 Whether hortatory or manda-
tory, dicta or decision, the examination of Field's compensation
obligation in the context of Illinois Central furthers the article's
project in two ways. First, it provides insight into the origins and
validity of the public trust doctrine. Second, the exploration
develops the various theoretical bases upon which equitable
compensation can, and should, be awarded in current public trust
cases.
56
B. Potential Rationales for Justice Field's Equitable
Compensation Suggestion
1. Mistaken Improver Law
One potential source for Justice Field's compensation
suggestion is the law with respect to mistaken improvers, that is,
those persons who mistakenly improve land owned by another.57
At common law, because they were considered fixtures, 5 improve-
55. Compare Brief for Appellant at 29 (claiming expenditure of $200,000 on
improvements) with Brief on Behalf of the State of Illinois at 158 (arguing that no
substantial improvements were constructed prior to the repeal of the Lake Front Act
in 1873). Perhaps Field only said the State "ought to pay" because he did not want
to investigate the ramifications for Illinois' sovereign immunity. This issue is
discussed in Part I.D, infra.
56. Of course, to the extent Field's compensation suggestion was directed not
at Illinois and the Railroad but at states and grantees more generally, the specific
references to Illinois law in the textual discussion that follows should be viewed
merely as exemplary of the type of equitable decisions being made in other state
courts. The focus on the specific compensation suggestion in Illinois Central can just
as readily be viewed as a vehicle for exploring the broader issue of equitable
compensation to grantees of public trust resources.
57. Mistaken improvement can actually occur in several ways:
First, an improver may acquire and improve land under a title that is
mistakenly believed to be valid. Second, an improver may mistake the
nature of his or her interest, believing it to be a fee simple when in fact
it is a mere life tenancy. Third, an improver may mistake the location of
his or her land. Last, an improver may have an expectancy in the land
that never ripens into title.
Kelvin H. Dickinson, Mistaken Improvers of Real Estate, 64 N.C. L. REV. 37, 37-38
(1985).
58. The doctrine of accession, or the law of fixtures, has deep and complex roots
in the common law. See John Henry Merryman, Improving the Lot of the Trespassing
Improver, 11 STAN. L. REV. 456, 480-81 (1959) (describing the roots of the mistaken
improver problem in the law of fixtures and the Latinate rule: quicquid plantatur
solo, solo cedit or "what is attached to the land becomes part of it"); see also Robert
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ments belonged to the owner of the land. 9 Nevertheless, by the
time Illinois Central was decided, a number of courts, acting on
the equitable maxim that he who seeks equity must do equity,
had held that when the true owner sought an equitable remedy,
the remedy was conditioned upon paying to the good faith
improver the reasonable value of any improvements." Illinois
was one such jurisdiction.61 Typically, such remedies were
available only to improvers who were able to show they had acted
in good faith and under color of title.6"
Although equitable compensation for mistaken improvers
was adopted in many courts, in others, improvements continued
to be treated as belonging to the true owner of the property.63
This relatively uneven protection of the common law, depending
as it did on courts' exercise of their equitable discretion, did not
C. Casad, The Mistaken Improver-A Comparative Study, 19 HASTINGS L.J. 1039,
1039 (1968) (noting same); Dickinson, supra note 57, at 38-39 (discussing same and
citing additional authority).
59. See Merryman, supra note 58, at 465; Casad, supra note 58.
60. Justice Story's statement in Bright v. Boyd captures the idea:
[S]o far as an innocent purchaser for a valuable consideration, without
notice of any infirmity in his title, has, by his improvements and
meliorations, added to the permanent value of the estate, he is entitled
to a full remuneration, and that such increase of value is a lien and
charge on the estate, which the absolute owner is bound to discharge,
before he is to be restored to his original rights in the land. This... has
the most persuasive equity, and, I may add, common sense and common
justice, for its foundation. The "Betterment Acts" (as they are commonly
called) . . . are founded upon the like equity, and were manifestly
intended to support it, even in suits at law for the recovery of the estate.
Bright v. Boyd, 4 F. Cas. 134, 135 (C.C.D. Me. 1843) (No. 1876); see also Preston v.
Brown, 35 Ohio St. 18, 28 (1878); Flint & Pere Marquette Ry. v. Gordon, 2 N.W. 648,
655-56 (Mich. 1879). See generally RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 42 reporters'
notes (1937); 2 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE
§ 390, at 65-67 (5th ed. 1941); HON. MR. JUSTICE STORY, COMMENTARIES ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE §§ 1237-1238, at 856-57 (2d ed. 1836); Dickinson, supra note 57, at
40; Casad, supra note 58, at 1040-41; Merryman, supra note 58, at 465-66.
61. See Williams v. Vanderbilt, 34 N.E. 476, 479 (Ill. 1893); Cable v. Ellis, 11
N.E. 188, 196 (Ill. 1887); Ebelmesser v. Ebelmesser, 99 Ill. 541, 549 (1881).
62. See, e.g., Williams, 34 N.E. at 479 ("In proceedings instituted by the real
owner it must appear that the party making the improvements did so under a claim
of title which turned out to be defective, or under some mistake concerning his rights,
or because he was induced to incur the expenditures through the fraud or deception
of the owner."); Smith v. Arthur, 34 P. 433 (Wash. 1893) (denying compensation
where occupant had notice that homestead entry had been allowed by inadvertence).
63. See Merryman, supra note 58, at 466; see also Williams, 34 N.E. at 479
(citing the "general rule" in Illinois that "improvements of a permanent character,
made upon real estate, and attached thereto, without the consent of the owner of the
fee, by one having no title or interest, become part of the realty, and vest in the
owner of the fee").
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accord with the general American public policy, operative from
earliest settlement into the late nineteenth century, that land
should be settled and resources put to productive use.64 To insure
that the law served the objectives of settlement and improvement,
states early enacted so-called betterment acts and occupying
claimant statutes which offered remedies to a good faith improver
if the improver was able to meet certain conditions.65 By the time
of the Illinois Central decision, a number of states, again includ-
ing Illinois,66 had enacted such statutes. 7 Similar to the equita-
ble principles adopted as a matter of common law, the two most
common conditions in those statutes were that the improver have
entered the property in good faith and under color of title.6' The
concept of "good faith," a common one in property law, generally
prevents those who know, or in the exercise of reasonable care
should know, of their lack of ownership from raising the equitable
64. See Casad, supra note 58, at 1041 (discussing this policy); Merryman, supra
note 58, at 466 (same). See generally John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias
in American Property Law, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 519 (1996) (discussing a nineteenth
century anti-wilderness bias that still influences modern property law). Cf. John G.
Sprankling, An Environmental Critique ofAdverse Possession, 79 CORNELL L. REV.
816 (1994) (discussing how adverse possession laws reflect a pro-development
nineteenth-century ideology that encourages exploitation of wild lands).
65. See Merryman, supra note 58, at 466. The earliest statute was enacted in
Virginia in 1643. See id. (citing 1 Stat. 260 (2d ed. Henning 1823) (Va.)). Basically
"the statutes make what is generally supposed to be the old equity rule-allowing the
improver a positive judgment by way of counterclaim-available even in actions at
law." Casad, supra note 58, at 1042.
66. See An Act in Regard to the Practice in Acts of Ejectments, 1872 Ill. Laws
370, §§ 48-56 (allowing an occupying claimant "the value of all such lasting and
valuable improvements" which were erected without notice of the adverse claim).
67. See ALA. CODE §§ 2702-2705 (1886); 1883 Ark. Acts No. 69, § 1-4; 1851 Cal.
Stat. ch.5, § 257; GA. CODE § 3468 (1882); 1881 Ind. Acts ch. 38, § 694; IOWA CODE
§§ 3151-3162 (1888); 1873 Kan. Sess. Laws, ch. 102 §§ 1-2; LA. CIV. CODE ART. 488-
532 (1870); 1882 Mass. Acts, c. 173 §§ 15-39; MINN. STAT. ch. 75 §§ 13-24 (1878); 1880
Miss. Laws § 2512; 1889 Mo. Laws §§ 4645-4654; 1883 Neb. Laws, ch. 59 §§ 1-11;
1876 N.Y. Laws §§ 1496-1497; TENN. CODE ANN. § 3261 (1858); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT.
ANN. arts. 4809, 4813-5816 (1879); 1820 Vt. Laws 35 §§ 15-16; W. VA. CODE § 1
(1882); 1878 Wis. Laws § 3096-3100. By 1985, 42 jurisdictions had "betterment" or
"occupying claimant" statutes. See Dickinson, supra note 57, at 42 & n.28 (1985)
(listing jurisdictions).
68. See Casad, supra note 58, at 1042 ("For the most part [the statutes']
provisions may be invoked only by improvers who acted in 'good faith' and under
'color of title,' although the meaning ascribed to these terms by judicial
interpretation varies.") (citation omitted); Dickinson, supra note 57, at 43 (same);
William L. Ziegler, Note, Good Faith and the Right to, Compensation For
Improvements on Land of Another, 6 W. RES. L. REV. 397, 398 (1955) (same).
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defense.69 The idea of "color of title" generally refers to taking
title under some instrument suggesting title in the land."° Once
the improver showed good faith and color of title, the statutes
provided for a variety of remedies, the most popular of which was
to give the true owner the option of selling the land to the
improver or paying the improver compensation for the value of
any improvements. 7
Thus, one potential source of Justice Field's suggestion that
Illinois "ought to pay" for improvements is this common-law and
statutory framework for mistaken improvers. Equitable compen-
sation for mistaken improvers, of course, was, and has continued
to be, awarded under a variety of equitable headings. It was
awarded on the basis of estoppel.72 It was awarded under
mistake of law and quasi contract theories, as a counterclaim for
recoupment or restitution.73 At other times, it was awarded on
the theory of a constructive trust-a trust that arises purely by
implication of equity without regard to the intention of the
69. See Clark v. Leavitt, 166 N.E. 538, 539 (Ill. 1929) ('Whether he is a
purchaser in good faith depends upon whether he had reason to suppose that his title
was good."); Dickinson, supra note 57, at 59-60. The textual definition of good faith
is, of course, a generalization. Court have adopted different definitions of good faith,
in some cases requiring actual notice of adverse claims and in other cases requiring
merely constructive notice. See id. at 57; see also Casad, supra note 58, at 1050
('There are, however, widely variant views as to what 'good faith' is in this context
[mistaken improver cases].").
70. See Wright v. Mattison, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 50, 56 (1855) (defining color of
title "to be that which in appearance is title, but which in reality is no title."). See
generally Casad, supra note 58, at 1052 (discussing definition of "color of title").
71. See Dickinson, supra note 57, at 44-45.
72. See generally Annotation, Compensation for Improvements Made or Placed
on Premises of Another by Mistake, 57 A.L.R. 2D 263, 270 (1958) (citing cases).
Estoppel would be the equitable basis for compensating a mistaken improver most
often in situations where the true owner misled the improver or acquiesced in the
improver's mistake. See Preston v. Brown, 35 Ohio St. 18, 28 (1878) ("[Ilf an owner
of an estate stands by and suffers another, acting in good faith and without notice
of his title, to place improvements thereon, which add permanent value to the estate,
such improvements will constitute a lien thereon."); Dickinson, supra note 57, at 61,
68-70. Cf. Kirk v. Hamilton, 102 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1880) (discussing application of
estoppel principles to title disputes); Wendell v. Van Rensselaer, 1 Johns. Ch. 344,
354 (N.Y. 1815) (Chancellor Kent discussing same).
73. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 42(3) (1937) ("A person who has
acquired an interest in land.., as the result of an agreement with the owner made
under a mistake of fact and avoided by the owner is entitled to restitution for the
value of services rendered in their preservation or in making appropriate
improvements thereon."); id. at § 53(3) (same).
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parties.4 Whatever the heading,7" the basic principle was the
same. The mistaken occupant was entitled to reimbursements for
improvements if she acted without fraud and in good faith.
Under any of these equitable headings, Field could have
concluded that because the state sought equity (quiet title and
rescission of the 1869 legislative grant), it needed to do equity
(pay compensation to the Railroad for any improvements). Of
course, before suggesting that the Railroad was entitled to
equitable compensation, Field would need to have concluded that
the Railroad possessed the submerged lands in good faith and
under color of title. There is little question that the Railroad
possessed the lands under color of title. The Lake Front Act was
certainly a legal instrument suggesting title to the submerged
lands. The question of the Railroad's good faith, however, is
closer and deserves scrutiny.
For purposes of analyzing whether the Railroad would have
merited equitable compensation as a good faith improver, one
useful definition of good faith is contained in two companion
opinions Justice Field authored some seven years before Illinois
74. See GEORGE T. BISHAM, THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUITY §§ 78, 92 at 118, 132-34
(4th ed. 1887); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 160 cmts. a & k (1937) (giving
example of case where X mistakenly conveys property to Y and suggesting that Y
holds the property upon a constructive trust); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 178
cmt. a (1937) ("Where property is transferred as a result of a mistake of such a
character that the transferor is entitled to restitution, the transferee holds the
property upon a constructive trust for the transferor; but if the transferee, having no
notice of the mistake, so changes his position that it would be inequitable to compel
him to surrender the property, the transferor can no longer enforce the constructive
trust.") (citation omitted); Case v. Kelly, 133 U.S. 21, 28-29 (1890) (Miller, J.)
(concluding that the true owner must give a good faith constructive trustee either
compensation for improvements or the right to remove the improvements).
Identifying the grantee of a trust resource as a constructive trustee should not be
confused with viewing the public trust doctrine as a subset of trust law. A
constructive trust is a creature of equity akin to a quasi-contract. It is not truly a
doctrine of trust law. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 160 cmt. a (1937). To the
extent the public trust doctrine is a species of trust law, equity would still require the
state to pay compensation for improvements. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 292(1) & cmt. d (1959) (stating that if the trustee in breach of trust transfers trust
property and no value is paid for the transfer, the gratuitous transferee who makes
improvements without notice "can be compelled to surrender the property only if he
is reimbursed for such expenditures, even though the property is not benefitted to
the extent of the amount expended"); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 291(3) (1959) (allowing compensation for improvements that enhance the value of
the trust corpus even where transferee took with notice of the trust).
75. For additional discussion of the equitable sources for awarding compen-
sation to mistaken improvers, see infra note 232.
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Central: Sparks v. Pierce76 and Deffeback v. Hawke.17  In
Deffeback, the reasoning of which was held to wholly dispose of
the same issue in Sparks,7" the plaintiff claimed title to certain
land by way of a mining law patent while the defendant claimed
title to the same land under laws relating to entry of public land
for use as a townsite.79 Field rejected the defendant's title claim,"°
and then addressed the defendant's request to be compensated for
improvements. After reviewing a Dakota territorial statute
which provided for compensation in cases where the mistaken
improver held the land "under color of title, adversely to the claim
of the plaintiff, in good faith," Field declined to order compensa-
tion." On the good faith requirement, he opined that "there can
be no such thing as good faith in an adverse holding, where the
party knows that he has no title, and that, under the law, which
he is presumed to know, he can acquire none by his occupation.'' 2
If Justice Field had in mind the definition of good faith from
Deffeback when he suggested in Illinois Central that Illinois
"ought to pay," Field arguably concluded that "under the law,
which [it] is presumed to know," 3 the Railroad could indeed have
acquired title. This conclusion, however, undermines two basic
tenets to which public trust doctrine advocates adhere: that the
doctrine had, prior to Illinois Central, a long-established,
common-law pedigree, and that the doctrine did not work a taking
under the Fourteenth Amendment because the submerged lands
were always impressed with an easement in favor of the public
76. 115 U.S. 408 (1885).
77. 115 U.S. 392 (1885); see also Searl v. School District No. 2, 133 U.S. 553, 561
(1890) (discussing a similar standard of good faith).
78. See Sparks, 115 U.S. at 413.
79. See Deffeback, 115 U.S. at 400. The defendant pointed to a land office entry
made by a local probate judge. See id. at 405-06.
80. The Court rejected the claim because entry under laws relating to townsites
was invalid where the land contained valuable minerals. Such lands could only be
entered under the Mining Act. See Deffeback, 115 U.S. at 401-06.
81. Deffeback, 115 U.S. at 407. On the color of title requirement, Field
elaborated that "[tjhere can be no color of title in an occupant who does not hold
under any instrument, proceeding, or law purporting to transfer to him the title or
to give him the right to possession." Id.
82. Id. (emphasis added). Although Field relied on a territorial statute in
Deffeback and Sparks, three years earlier he had suggested that a similar good faith
standard applied as a matter of equity. See Steel v. Smelting Co., 106 U.S. 447, 456-
57 (1882).
83. Deffeback, 115 U.S. at 407.
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and thus the exercise of that easement did not take anything that
was ever given.84
In Deffeback, Field was unable to find good faith because the
law, which the improver was presumed to know, did not allow the
improver to acquire title. Applying the same standard in Illinois
Central, his compensation suggestion implies a belief that the
Railroad acted in good faith because, under the law at the time of
the grant, there was no impediment to the Railroad acquiring fee
title to submerged lands. Although this view of the law at the
time of the grant was accurate, 5 it is certainly not the view of
Illinois Central advocated by adherents to the modern public
trust doctrine. If, as public trust adherents claim, the 1869 grant
had from its inception been impressed with an easement in behalf
of the public, and particularly if that easement was firmly rooted
in the common law and, even further back, in Roman law,86 how
could the Railroad have acted in "good faith"? Why was it
entitled to compensation?
Although Justice Field's definition of "good faith" in Deffeback
suggested that no compensation was permissible where the party
could not have acquired title "under the law, which [it] is pre-
84. See infra note 86 (citing arguments for a long public trust pedigree). See
supra note 14 (citing cases and commentators which have suggested that the public
trust doctrine does not work a taking because it takes nothing that was ever given
to the grantee); see also Huffman, supra note 8, at 568 ("The wonder of the public
trust doctrine is that it evades the takings issue by insisting that the public rights
in question predate all private rights.").
85. See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text (discussing how prior to
Illinois Central, states were generally understood to have the power to grant land
under navigable water or other trust resources in fee, as long as they did so in plain
and explicit language); see also David P. Currie, The Constitution in the Supreme
Court: The Protection of Economic Interests, 1889-1910, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 324, 331-
33 (1985) (discussing the creative law-making of Illinois Central).
86. A number of articles and judicial decisions trace the origins of the public
trust doctrine back to Roman law. See, e.g., State v. Central Vt. Ry., Inc., 571 A.2d
1128, 1130 (Vt. 1989) ("The public trust doctrine is an ancient one, having its roots
in the Justinian Institutes of Roman law."); Caminiti v. Boyle, 732 P.2d 989, 994
(Wash. 1987) ('The principle that the public has an overriding interest in navigable
waterways and lands under them is at least as old as the Code of Justinian .... ");
Blumm & Schwartz, supra note 9, at 713 ('The trust doctrine's common-law origins
can, in fact, be traced back to medieval England and ultimately to Roman law.")
(footnote omitted). But see Patrick Deveney, Title, Jus Publicun, and the Public
Trust: An Historical Analysis, 1 SEA GRANT L.J. 13, 16 (1976) (criticizing "recent
writers in the field of public rights in coastal lands and waters" for holding up
"Roman law as the paradigm of a lost Edenic state of perfect communal ownership
of and public control over coastal area resources").
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sumed to know,""7 his compensation suggestion irf Illinois Central
may not have been premised on such a strict rule of good faith.
Deffeback's suggestion that good faith could never exist where a
party makes a mistake of law would eliminate a large number of
claims for mistaken improvement. But equity often allowed, and
still allows, compensation for improvements where a conveyance
granted as a result of a mistake of law is revoked or rescinded.8
Although it is generally the case that equity will not aid a person
who enters land with knowledge that the land would need to be
reconveyed upon a certain contingency, courts have not always
denied compensation in such situations. 9 In fact, mistaken
improver cases reveal a wide variety of approaches by courts to
the issue of good faith.9" Given this discretion-laden, case-by-case
approach, which is a hallmark of equity courts, it is difficult to
discern a clear demarcation between the instances in which
compensation will or will not be allowed. Thus it is difficult to
assert with certitude that Field believed a person could never
make a mistake of law in good faith.
Nevertheless, if there is one common element that can be
drawn from the cases where compensation is awarded, it is that
the improver must have a reasonable belief that she has title. 9'
Thus, even if Justice Field concluded that the Railroad had made
87. 115 U.S. at 407.
88. See, e.g., Searl v. School District No. 2, 133 U.S. 553, 563-64 (1890) (giving
a more liberal definition of good faith); Bright v. Boyd, 4 F. Cas. 127 (C.C.D. Me.
1841) (No. 1875) (setting aside probate court sale after eight years).
89. See Dickinson, supra note 57, at 56 (citing cases). Compare Fee v. Cowdry,
45 Ark. 410 (1885), and Folsom v. Clark, 72 Me. 44 (1881) (improver granted
compensation where he improved land under agreement with life tenant thinking
that life tenant was able to convey fee simple), with Beard v. Dansby, 2 S.W. 701
(Ark. 1887) (improver with knowledge that he does not own'fee simple title not
entitled to compensation), and Gibson v. Hutchins, 12 La. Ann. 545 (1857) (improver
denied compensation because he occupied merely with the hope of securing a
preemption).
90. See generally Casad, supra note 58; Dickinson, supra note 57; Ziegler, supra
note 68.
91. See Casad, supra note 58, at 1051 (discussing the common definition of good
faith that emphasizes "the improver's good faith belief in his own title and the
absence of any suspicion that another may be challenging his claim") (citation
omitted); Dickinson, supra note 57, at 55, 59-60; Ziegler, supra note 68, at 404 ("The
test used by the courts is whether or not the occupant improved the land under the
honest belief he owned the fee. He is also required to have based this honest belief
on reasonable grounds.") (citation omitted). Unsurprisingly, an occupant's
reasonable belief is often exhibited by showing color of title. See Dickinson, supra
note 57, at 55.
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a mistake of law, at very leasthe must have seen the Railroad's
conduct as reasonable. What is again curious is that if the public
trust doctrine were as firmly embedded in the law as some have
argued, it would have been anomalous for Field to conclude that
the Railroad reasonably believed it had fee title. Thus, even if
Justice Field had in mind a broader "reasonableness" approach to
good faith, the idea that the public trust doctrine was well-settled
prior to Illinois Central is subtly undermined by Field's compen-
sation suggestion.
If Field concluded that the Railroad acted in good faith,
however defined, another part of the lore of Illinois Central that
is undermined is an oft-repeated but little supported contention
that the Lake Front Act was the product of corruption. Attempt-
ing to justify or explain the Court's adoption of the public trust
doctrine, certain commentators have perceived corruption in the
legislative process.92 This perception fits with the argument
advanced by certain commentators that the public trust doctrine
compensates for "defects" in the democratic process.93 Those who
see corruption in the 1869 grant often rely on the observation in
Justice Field's opinion that "[t]he circumstances attending the
passage of the act through the legislature were on the hearing the
92. See, e.g., GUSTAVUS MYERS, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES 574 (1968); WATERS, supra note 2, § 30.02(b)(1) (repeating suggestion);
Currie, supra note 85, at 331 ("The Illinois legislature had, under shady
circumstances, granted virtually all the land under Chicago's harbor to a railroad
and then attempted to take it back."); id. ("One cannot know to what extent the
result in Illinois Central was influenced by the sense that the deal was less than
honest."); Richard Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411, 425 (1987)
("When Justice Field struck down the grant to the railroad, he acted not to restrict
the power of ordinary conveyances, but to prevent the abuse of legislative power that
might well have transpired."); Ralph W. Johnson & William C. Galloway,
Biodiversity Symposium: Protection of Biodiversity under the Public Trust Doctrine,
8 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 21, 24 (1994) ("Despite duly (and probably corruptly) enacted state
legislation, the title was at least voidable, if not void."). As Currie notes, Marshall's
refusal to investigate legislative motive in the similar circumstances of Fletcher v.
Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), made it difficult for the Court to invalidate the
grant on grounds of bribery or improper influence. See Currie, supra note 85, at 331.
But once the public trust doctrine was identified as a power allowing revocation, if
the Court found fraud it seems unlikely that it would have suggested compensation,
unless that was simply a nod in the direction of Fletcher's broader holding.
93. See, e.g., Blumm, supra note 9, at 580 (calling the public trust doctrine "a
democratizing force"); Sax, supra note 18, at 509 (arguing that the public trust
doctrine is a "medium for democratization"); id. at 521 ('The 'public trust' has no life
of its own and no intrinsic content. It is no more-and no less-than a name courts
give to their concerns about the insufficiencies of the democratic process.").
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subject of much criticism."94 But this reference is not one to
corruption but to various technical challenges to the legislative
process by Chicago and the State. 95 Among other things, they
argued that the Lake Front Act violated state constitutional
requirements that the bill be read on three different days in each
house, that each house keep a journal of its proceedings, and that
the title of the act express its subject.96 Like Justice Harlan
below,97 Justice Field rejected these challenges finding that "the
evidence was insufficient" to support the claims.9" Not only did
the Court have trouble finding corruption in the circumstances
surrounding the passage of the Act, but also it is hard to believe
that the Lake Front Act corruptly subverted the popular will
94. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 451. See, e.g., WATERS, supra note 2, § 30.02
(b)(1) (relying on this passage).
95. Actual allegations of corruption were made, but not in the parties' briefs.
In an 1881 pamphlet, the Illinois Anti-Monopoly League alleged:
[WMe come to what is known as the "Lake Front Steal," perpetrated by
this company, in 1869, with the aid of a Legislature of odorous memory.
The nature of this statute sufficiently indicates that infamous
methods were employed to obtain it. Some of these were the retaining of
divers "attorneys" in the counties of this State, shortly before the election,
ostensibly for legitimate business of the company, but really to pack the
Legislature. When it met, the usual methods of monopolies, bribery,
intimidation, log-rolling and obstruction of all public business until their
job was accomplished, were resorted to, and the act of April 16, 1869, was
finally rushed through over the Governor's veto.
A.S. BRADLEY, REPORT OF THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE CLAIMS OF THE ILLINOIS
CENTRAL RAILROAD TO THE LAKE FRONT AND SUBMERGED LANDS ADJOINING, UNDER
THE "LAKE FRONT STEAL" OF 1869 (Illinois Anti-Monopoly League, 1881). The
Report's failure to provide any specific instances of this corruption, however,
suggests that it may have been hyperbole. Bessie Pierce, in her history of Chicago,
also reports that the Lake Front Act "was commonly known as the 'Lake Front
Steal'." 3 BESSIE PIERCE, A HISTORY OF CHICAGO 319 (1957). But she does not relate
any instances of bribery or sub rosa activities. According to Pierce, the public's ire
was directed primarily at sections 4-6 of the Act which allowed Illinois Central and
three other railroad companies to purchase certain lakefront property for a payment
of $800,000 to Chicago's park fund. See supra note 19 (discussing this section of the
Act). Those who opposed the Act argued that the property should be used for a park
rather than a railroad depot. See id.; see also 2 BESSIE PIERCE, A HISTORY OF
CHICAGO 296, 342 (1940).
96. See Brief on Behalf of the State of Illinois at 2-52; Argument for the City of
Chicago at 2-8. The origin of these technical challenges was that as originally
introduced, the Lake Front Act purported to give Chicago control of the submerged
lands so that it could control and enlarge its harbor. 146 U.S. at 450-51. When the
grantee was changed to the Railroad, questions followed about which reading of the
bill counted. See id.
97. See Illinois v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 33 F. at 760-71 (reviewing Illinois
precedent and rejecting these state constitutional challenges).
98. See 146 U.S. at 451.
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when the Act was passed over the governor's veto,99 and by a
supermajority of the state legislature.' ° The Act, therefore, does
not appear to have resulted from a defect in democracy, unless
one believes that democracy itself is defective."°
Field's compensation suggestion confirms that he likely did
not view the legislative process as corrupt or fraudulent. One
aspect of mistaken improver law, and the definition of good faith,
that appeared in almost every case, was that no compensation
could be recovered where the improver had perpetrated a fraud
or deception. Field's 1878 dissent in Jackson v. Ludeling, °2 from
an award of compensation for improvements is an example of just
such an emphasis:
[C]ourts of chancery do not give to an occupant compensation
for improvements, unless there are circumstances attending
his possession which affect the conscience of the owner, and
impose an obligation upon him to pay for them or to allow for
their value against a demand for the use of the property. To
a possessor whose title originates in fraud, or is attended with
circumstances of circumvention and deception, no compensa-
tion for improvements is ever allowed."°3
99. See id. at 405. In its Supreme Court briefs, the Railroad finds support for
its interpretation of the Lake Front Act in Governor John M. Palmer's veto message,
observing that the governor criticized the Act because "the act, if passed, would
conclude the state from claiming the proprietary and other rights granted by it."
Brief and Argument for Appellant at 90-91 (discussing but not quoting the
Governor's veto message).
100. See ILL. CONST. art. V, § 16 (requiring two-thirds of each house in the
General Assembly to override a veto).
101. One might wonder whether this is at the bottom of many arguments that
the public trust doctrine properly allows judges to remedy defects in the democratic
process. To the extent there was "corruption" in the legislative process, it was
probably in their solicitude toward large aggregations of capital with political clout,
a problem that remains part of democracy to this day. Indeed, such "corruption" was
likely at the heart of the Anti Monopoly League's criticisms of the Lake Front Act.
See supra note 95. But if judges are to be allowed to reject legislation on this basis
and without reference to the Constitution. there is little legislation that could not be
rejected, particularly from the last 30 years of the nineteenth century.
102. 99 U.S. 513 (1878).
103. Id. at 537 (Field, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). Field dissented from
the Court's decision to allow compensation because the Court had found that the
improvers "were possessors in bad faith, having obtained control of the road
fraudulently.... The defendants knew all the time the vice of their title; they knew
they were not possessors in good faith; they concocted the scheme by which the
fraudulent sale was made; and this court has so adjudged." Id. at 536-37.
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Given this basic condition of equitable compensation, Field must,
at very least, have concluded that the 1869 grant did not "origi-
nate[] in fraud," was not "attended with circumstances of
circumvention and deception," and was sufficient to "affect the
conscience" of the State and impose on it an obligation to pay. 104
Given that a finding of good faith-whether defined broadly
or narrowly-undermines the public trust doctrine, one possible
reading of Field's compensation suggestion is that it is purely
instrumentalist. Under this view, there is no need to reconcile
Field's support of the public trust doctrine with a finding of the
Railroad's good faith. Although the ideas are contradictory,
overall they accomplish rough justice. Given his view of the
public injustice done by granting such a vast area of the harbor,
Field presumably believed the Railroad was not entitled to the
submerged lands. Yet, despite his effort to muster precedent
supporting the public trust doctrine,0 5 he could not quite swallow
whole the notion that it had a long-established, common-law
pedigree: he knew that courts generally had not limited state
power to convey fee title to submerged lands."0 6 Thus, whatever
his beliefs about the injustice of the grant, Field surely knew that
the Railroad had acted in good faith because the Railroad could
not have known that the harbor lands were imposed with a public
trust easement when they were transferred. Under this view of
Field's thinking, although he was not willing to directly under-
mine his public trust conclusion by a thorough explanation of the
Railroad's good faith, he was willing to quietly undermine it by
suggesting compensation.
104. See id. at 537 (Field, J., dissenting). This conclusion could be inaccurate
if the compensation suggestion were not directed at the case before him but at public
trust cases more generally, which was probably not the case. See supra note 55 and
accompanying text. Another argument against this conclusion is that Field departed
from his Jackson dissent and decided that compensation was necessary even in the
presence of corruption. This conclusion seems unlikely but in Fletcher v. Peck, 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) 87. (1810), Justice Marshall had decided that the Contract Clause
forbade a state from reneging on a land grant even though that grant had been the
result of fraud and corruption. Thus, although Field refused to follow Fletcher's
admonition that legislation repudiating a prior grant was a violation of the Contract
Clause, one could argue that he was following its precept with respect to
compensation for improvements, again assuming he perceived corruption at all.
105. See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 455-59.
106. Field as much as admitted the weakness of his supporting precedent when
he conceded that he could not "cite any authority where a grant of this kind [had]
been held invalid." 146 U.S. at 455. See infra note 134 (citing articles critical of
historical support for the public trust doctrine of Illinois Central).
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Under such an instrumentalist reading of Field's reasoning,
the public trust doctrine and compensation for improvements are
arguably incompatible.' °7 If states had always been without the
power to make such large grants of submerged lands, no compen-
sation for improvements was warranted because the Railroad's
improvements were not erected in good faith.' And, if such
grants had previously been permissible, Illinois' revocation
constituted a Fourteenth Amendment taking and required
compensation not just for improvements but for the lands
themselves. To those who view the public trust doctrine as
something of a fiction, this instrumentalist reading of Field's
opinion clearly has some attraction in the way it "exposes" his
own discomfort with the doctrine.
2. Equitable Compensation As Part and Parcel of the
Public Trust Doctrine
Despite this attraction, Justice Field's compensation sugges-
tion need not be read as quite so contrary to his reliance on the
public trust doctrine. A different, and more appealing, reading of
Justice Field's compensation suggestion is to conceptualize it as
part and parcel of the public trust doctrine. The primary
difference between this approach and that of mistaken improver
law is that the compensation requirement becomes part of the
public trust doctrine itself rather than arising as a separate
equitable counterclaim or defense.
107. Presuming good faith by the Railroad is only compatible with the public
trust doctrine where good faith is defined in the broadest sense. If, for example, good
faith means nothing more than that "circumstances" exist which should "affect the
conscience" of the state and impose an obligation upon it to pay, see Jackson v.
Ludeling, 99 U.S. at 537 (Field, J., dissenting), then perhaps a grantee with notice
of the public trust doctrine could still be said to have acted in good faith and be
entitled to improvements. At bottom though, this view of good faith, is not
significantly distinct from the view, discussed in the next section of the text, that
compensation for improvements is part and parcel of the public trust doctrine.
Essentially, the grantee of trust resources with notice of the public trust doctrine is
relying in good faith upon compensation as a condition of revocation.
108. Again, it is a basic principle of mistaken improver law that one who
improves land knowing it belongs to another is not entitled to compensation. See
Dickinson, supra note 57, at 50; Ziegler, note 68, at 404 ("An occupying claimant who
improves land with knowledge that he does not own the fee simple title is not usually
entitled to compensation because he is in bad faith.").
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In property law terms, under the trust doctrine the state
retains a "right of entry" or a "power of termination."' 10 9 The
state's right of entry, however, is "constructive" because it is not
a written term of the initial grant; it is instead imposed as a
matter of policy.1"' Thus, rather than conceptualizing compensa-
tion as an equitable limit on the state's exercise of its property
right, compensation can be viewed as an additional constructive
term of the initial grant. The harshness of the constructive public
trust is meliorated by an additional constructive condition of
compensation. Or, to put the two together, the state could be said
to retain a constructive limited right of revocation: it may revoke
a prior grant of trust resources as long as it pays compensation
for improvements. If compensation is a constructive term of the
initial grant, then in pleading terms the compensation require-
ment becomes an element of a public trust claim rather than a
defense or counterclaim.1"' The state must prove that adequate
compensation can be, or has been, made as a part of its prima
facie public trust case, or it cannot revoke the grant.1 '2
109. See generally ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM, ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY 85-87
(2d ed. 1993) (setting forth basic types of future interests). Typically, under a right
of entry or power of termination, the grantor conveys property to the grantee subject
to the condition subsequent that if the grantee uses the property for a certain
purpose-for example, as a liquor store, or other than for a school-the grantor may
re-enter and take back the property. See id. See generally GRANT S. NELSON, ET AL.,
CONTEMPORARY PROPERTY 245-66 (1996) (discussing reversionary future interests).
110. See, e.g., State v. Central Vt. Ry., 571 A.2d 1128, 1135 (Vt. 1989)
(concluding that by virtue of the public trust doctrine the court can "infer a condition
subsequent" that the State has a "right of re-entry" if certain lands along Lake
Champlain are not used for railroad, wharf, or storage purposes), cert. denied, 495
U.S. 931 (1990); Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. v. Commonwealth, 393 N.E.2d 356,
366-67 (Mass. 1979) (viewing public trust as creating an implied condition
subsequent that conveyed lands be used for marine commerce).
111. This view of compensation as an element of the state's public trust claim
is perhaps easier to understand with reference to a basic reversionary interest
hypothetical. Suppose that X grants property to Y so long as Y uses the property as
a school. If Y ceases to use the property as a school, X may re-enter. Suppose that
X brings an action to eject Y from the property. X would have the burden of proving
that Y was no longer operating a school. Similarly, in the public trust case, before
the state may re-enter or terminate a grant of trust resources, it must prove that
adequate compensation has been or will be made.
112. For examples of cases where courts have refused to allow the grantor to re-
enter because she failed to prove that the condition for reversion had been met, see
Springineyer v. City of South Lake Tahoe, 183 Cal. Rptr. 43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)
(condition that reversion would occur if property not used for "government office
purposes" not met where land used for county government instead of city
government); Miller v. Stoppel, 241 P.2d 488 (Kan. 1952) (refusing to determine
which grantor would take a reversion where land granted for use as a church was
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One of the unresolved questions from Illinois Central is
whether a grant of trust resources is voidable or void ab initio.
There is language in Illinois Central suggestive of both
concepts.113 And subsequent courts have taken different ap-
proaches. 4  Justice Field's compensation suggestion lends
additional credibility to the voidability interpretation of Illinois
Central. If a grant of a trust resource is void from its inception,
and if that rule is firmly grounded in precedent, it makes little
sense to compensate an improver because an improver who acts
contrary to known or knowable law is generally not acting in good
faith. If, however, the premise of the public trust doctrine is that
grants are revocable, payment of compensation is logical. A
person negotiating with a state for a grant of trust resources that
she knew would be revocable at the state's pleasure would surely
insist on the minimum protection that she could recoup whatever
investment she had made prior to revocation." If grants of trust
still being used as a church); Priddy v. School District, 219 P. 141 (Okla. 1923)
(refusing to find reversion where land granted for use of schoolhouse was still being
used as a schoolhouse although an oil well had also been added to the property).
113. Compare 146 U.S. at 455 ("Any grant of [this] kind is necessarily
revocable."), with id. at 453 ("A grant of all the lands under the navigable waters of
a State has never been adjudged to be within the legislative power . . ."). See
generally WATERS, supra note 2, § 30.02(d) n.182 (discussing this dichotomy).
114. Compare Lake Mich. Fed'n v. United States Army Corp of Eng'rs, 742 F.
Supp. 441 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (reading Illinois Central as holding that the grant was
void); People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 360 N.E.2d 773 (Ill. 1976) (same);
and CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755 P.2d 1115, 1117 (Alaska 1988) (holding that
Illinois was free to revoke grant "because it had possessed no power to validly convey
such land in the first place"), with City of Berkeley v. Superior Court of Alameda
County, 606 P.2d .362, 365 (Cal. 1980) ('The court held that the grant was
revocable."), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 840 (1980). See also WATERS, supra note 2,
§ 30.02(d)(1) (suggesting that the proper interpretation of Illinois Central and its
progeny is not as limiting state power but as recognizing state power to revoke,
modify, or limit prior grants).
115. This general statement may be subject to some exceptions. For example,
a grantee may desire a grant of trust resources even if the state will not pay for
improvements if the grantee believes that it can take advantage of the resource
without any investment in improvements or if the cost of improvements is minimal
compared with the return from exploiting the resource. This possibility is reflected
in California's statute providing for compensation for improvements upon state
repossession of tidelands or submerged lands. See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 6312 (West
1996) ("Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to prevent the parties to a grant
or patent of tidelands from agreeing, as a part of such grant or patent, that there
shall be no compensation paid for any improvement made on those tidelands to
which such an agreement relates."). Presumably, such a situation would only arise
if the grantee believed it would be allowed to exploit the resource for the length of
time necessary to recoup its expenses plus some additional marginal benefit. And,
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resources are merely voidable, then Field's' ompensation
suggestion is best understood as a component of the public trust
doctrine, as a condition of revocation. Specifically, a state may
revoke a grant of trust resources so long as it pays compensation
for any improvements erected in reliance upon the grant.
116
Although the idea that revocation is conditioned upon
compensation supports the concept that grants of trust resources
are voidable, it does little to shore up the foundations of the
public trust doctrine. The compensation obligation's validity
extends only so far as that of the public trust doctrine. In other
words, it does not eliminate one fiction (that a state can revoke
previously granted fee title to land under navigable water without
implicating the Fourteenth Amendment) to add another (as long
as it pays compensation for improvements). Nevertheless,
viewing compensation as an additional constructive term of the
initial grant is superior to viewing compensation as an equitable
defense or counterclaim. Instead of contradicting the public trust
doctrine," 7 equitable compensation merely refines its scope.
Compensation and the public trust doctrine rise or fall together."'
where the state can revoke the grant at any time, any recoupment plan is subject to
substantial risk. This idea that a grant can fairly be subject to revocation because
the grantee can foresee its obsolescence and conduct its business accordingly has also
been used to justify the no compensation rule with respect to the navigation
servitude. See Eva H. Morreale, Federal Power in Western Waters: The Navigation
Power and the Rule of No Compensation, 3 NAT. RESOURCES J. 1, 35-36 (1963). It is
an equally suspect rationale in that context. See id. at 36 ("[Tjhe most perspicacious
of business judgments would have difficulty harmonizing the length of the
recoupment period with the point in time at which Congress might decide to
appropriate the entire flow of the river.") (emphasis in original).
116. Note that under this reading of the compensation requirement, the
grantee's status as a "mistaken" improver is not particularly important. The state's
power to revoke is conditioned on its willingness to pay for improvements. See infra
Part II.A.1. (discussing this issue at greater length).
117. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text (explaining how awarding
compensation for improvements made in good faith is in conflict with the idea of a
long-standing and well-known public trust easement impressed upon the initial
grant).
118. If one views the public trust doctrine not as a constructive but rather as
an actual easement, then compensation should likewise be viewed as an actual and
not as a constructive part of the grantee's property right. Alternatively, if one views
the public trust doctrine as having a constructive and equitable origin which has
since ripened into an actual property right, compensation should have ripened right
along with it into an actual property right. Of course, to the extent compensation is
viewed as a constructive condition on the state's actual property right, it would be
little different than viewing it as an equitable defense, except perhaps for purposes
of avoiding sovereign immunity. See infra notes 182-85 and accompanying text. The
equity (good faith and lack of notice) supporting the constructive condition would still
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In the final analysis, whatever the superior approach, once Field
made the decision to allow states to revoke grants without regard
for the Fourteenth Amendment, he was correct that equity
demanded compensation.
C. The Relationship Between Justice Field's
Compensation Suggestion and the No Compensation
Rule of the Navigation Servitude
Another aspect of Justice Field's compensation suggestion
worthy of inspection is its relationship to the no compensation
rule of the federal navigation servitude. Under the no compensa-
tion rule, when the United States exercises its navigation
servitude to destroy or devalue private property, it need not pay
compensation under the Fifth Amendment.'19 Thus, the United
States need not pay compensation when it removes a riparian's
access to a navigable waterway 2 ' or impairs the flow of a
navigable waterway.12 ' And when the United States condemns
fast lands adjacent to a navigable watercourse, it need not
compensate the owner of the fast lands for the value of the land
be in conflict with the idea of a long-standing, well-known easement.
119. A commonly cited description of the navigation servitude is in United
States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.A., 312 U.S. 592 (1941):
The dominant power of the federal government, as has been repeatedly
held, extends to the entire bed of a stream, which includes the lands
below ordinary high-water mark. The exercise of the power within these
limits is not an invasion of any private property right in such lands for
which the United States must make compensation. The damage
sustained results not from a taking of the riparian owner's property in
the stream bed, but from the lawful exercise of a power to which that
property has always been subject.
Id. at 596-97 (citations omitted). See generally WATERS, supra note 2, §35.02(c);
Morreale, supra note 115, at 19-21 (discussing the navigation servitude). The United
States' navigation servitude which has been conceived of in the nature of 'an
easement should be distinguished from its power to regulate navigation under the
Commerce Clause, which, in turn, should be distinguished from Congress' even
broader regulatory authority under the Commerce Clause generally. See United
States v. Kansas City Life Ins. Co., 339 U.S. 799, 808 (1950) ("It is not the broad
constitutional power to regulate commerce, but rather the servitude derived from
that power and narrower in scope, that frees the government from liability ... ").
120. See, e.g., United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 123 (1967) (construction of
federal dike blocked river access); United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S.
386 (1945) (dredging and filling eliminated navigability of tidewater creek); Scranton
v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141 (1900) (pier blocked access).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945);
United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 74-76 (1913).
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attributable to the presence of the navigable waterway.122 This
general immunity from Fifth Amendment takings claims under
the navigation servitude is much like the state's immunity from
Fourteenth Amendment claims under the public trust doctrine.
But the rule of the navigation servitude goes further. The United
States has no obligation to compensate for improvements
destroyed as a result of its exercise of its navigation servitude.'23
The equitable compensation obligation articulated in Illinois
Central thus appears to partially contradict the no compensation
rule for the navigation servitude. Why should the state have an
obligation to compensate for improvements when it exercises its
dominant public trust servitude if the United States has no
obligation to compensate for improvements when it exercises its
dominant navigation servitude?'24
It is difficult to see any reason why the two doctrines should
come to a different result because the justification for the
122. See, e.g., Rands, 389 U.S. at 124-25; United States v. Twin City Power Co.,
350 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1956). Thus, even though property next to a navigable stream
may be valuable chiefly as a potential portsite or hydroelectric site, that fact will not
be part of the just compensation calculation. See Twin City Power, 350 U.S. at 225-
26. See generally Morreale, supra note 115, at 47-62 (explicating the case law on this
issue); WATERS, supra note 2, § 35.02(c)(1). This same reasoning has been applied
in grazing cases. When the United States condemns property, it need not
compensate for the increased value of that property which results from a neighboring
grazing permit because the United States is free to terminate a grazing lease without
compensation. See United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 491-92 (1973). Were a
similar principle incorporated into public trust law, the result could be dramatic. A
state exercising its eminent domain would not need to compensate the owner because
of the property's access to trust resources. Given the expanding list of so-called trust
resources, see, e.g., Caminiti v. Boyle, 732 P.2d 989, 994 (Wash. 1987) (suggesting
that the public trust doctrine applies not simply to land under navigable water but
to "its incidental rights of fishing, boating, swimming, water skiing, and other related
recreational purposes"); Scott Reed, The Public Trust Doctrine: Is It Amphibious? 1
J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 107, 116-21 (collecting cases extending the public trust doctrine
beyond its traditional scope), this could significantly diminish the compensation
owed by the state.
123. See, e.g., United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R., 312
U.S. 592, 595-597 (1941) (railroad tracks and telephone polls); Louisville Bridge Co.
v. United States, 242 U.S. 409 (1917) (bridge); Greenleaf Johnson Lumber Co. v.
Garrison, 237 U.S. 251 (1915) (wharves); Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v.
Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913) (oyster beds); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water
Power Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913) (power plant); United States v. Certain Parcels of
Land, 666 F.2d 1236 (9th Cir. 1982) (alteration of ferry terminal).
124. The navigation servitude has been alternately referred to as the "superior
navigation easement," see, e.g., United States v. Grand River Dam Auth., 363 U.S.
229, 231 (1960), and as the "dominant servitude." See, e.g., Federal Power Comm'n
v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp., 347 U.S. 239, 249 (1954).
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navigation servitude is grounded in the same historical account
commonly proffered for the public trust doctrine. 2 ' Under that
common account, the English Crown is said to have held title to
land under navigable waters in trust for the people for purposes
of navigation, commerce, and fishery. The Crown could not
alienate the land subject to this trust and was obligated to
preserve the public's rights. 26 Upon the Revolution, the story
goes, the American states took title to the land under navigable
water subject to these same trust obligations and likewise could
not interfere with the public's rights to navigate, conduct
commerce, and fish upon navigable waters.
127
Under this account, the states never possessed the power to
interfere with the public's right to navigation and the fishery.
They had a trust obligation to the public. Because of that trust
obligation, the states could not convey fee title in land beneath
navigable water, including lesser grants of a several fishery or a
private right of passage. The most that a grantee could receive
would be title subject to an easement in favor of the state. And
thus any subsequent exercise of the sovereign's dominant
servitude could not be a taking of private property. 12' The United
States then inherited from the states, via the Constitution's
Commerce Clause, the dominant servitude with respect to
navigation, 129 and, the story continues, the states maintained the
dominant servitude with respect to the fishery, and any other
interest associated with land under navigable waters that can be
shoe-horned into the public trust.'3 ° When the United States
125. See WATERS, supra note 2, § 30.05 at 74-75 (discussing the striking
similarities between the federal navigation servitude and the public trust doctrine).
126. A vast number of cases give this historical account. See Shively v. Bowlby,
152 U.S. 1, 57 (1894); Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 456; Martin v. Waddell's Lessee,
41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410-11 (1842); Caminiti 732 P.2d at 993; State v. Central Vt.
Ry., Inc., 571 A.2d 1128, 1130 (Vt. 1989); Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 718-19.
127. See generally Shively, 152 U.S. at 57; Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 456;
Martin, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 410-11; Caminiti 732 P.2d at 993; Central Vt. Ry., Inc.,
571 A.2d at 1130; Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 718-19.
128. See generally Morreale, supra note 115, at 19-21 (discussing the navigation
servitude).
129. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 193 (1824) ('The word used in
the constitution, then, comprehends, and has been always understood to
comprehend, navigation within its meaning; and a power to regulate navigation, is
as expressly granted, as if that term had been added to the word 'commerce."').
130. Those states that subsequently entered the Union received title to their
land under navigable water under the equal footing doctrine. See Shively, 152 U.S.
1, 26-28 (1894). See generally Rasband, supra note 6 (discussing origins of equal
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exercises its dominant servitude in favor of navigation, it need
not pay any compensation. And when a state exercises its
dominant servitude in favor of other trust resources, it likewise
need not pay compensation, except, that is, for improvements
constructed in reliance upon a grant of those resources.
It is that last exception-providing for compensation for
improvements-that seems to create a contradiction in Justice
Field's reasoning. Why should a state pay compensation for
improvements if the federal government does not need to do so?
Although the initial inclination might be to answer this contradic-
tion by labeling it as another example of Field's instrumentalist
approach, it cannot be answered so facilely. Field cannot be
accused of departing from the no compensation rule because at
the time Illinois Central was decided the no compensation rule for
the navigation servitude did not exist. The Court's first articula-
tion of the no compensation rule was in 1897.1" And four years
footing doctrine); John Hanna, Equal Footing in the Admission of States, 3 BAYLOR
L. REV. 519 (1951) (same). Presumably, that title was burdened with whatever trust
it had been burdened with during the United States' possession. In the case of the
those public lands east of the Mississippi River acquired by the United States under
deeds of cession from the landholding states, see Rasband, supra note 6, at 30-34, the
United States' title bore the same encumbrances as had the title of the granting
states. Thus, the United States' ability to transfer title burdened with a trust
depended on whether the original states' title was so encumbered. With respect to
the public lands west of the Mississippi, it is more difficult to locate a source for the
encumbrance. The most likely candidate is federal common law which simply
replicated whatever common-law encumbrance burdened the property of the original
states. Of course, to the extent the original states' land beneath navigable water was
never burdened with a public trust servitude, the land under navigable water in the
territories would not have been encumbered. In fact, given the equal footing
doctrine's recognition of the United States' power to make grants of land under
navigable water, there is at least implicit recognition that during the territorial
period the land under navigable water was not burdened with the same type of trust
obligation as existed in Illinois Central. See generally Rasband, supra note 6
(exploring this issue).
131. See Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897) (holding for the first time
that the federal power to protect navigation constituted federal immunity from
compensation). Progress toward the no compensation rule was not uniform, however,
as the Court soon thereafter required the United States to pay compensation to
remove a boom constructed with state authorization across Washington's Nooksack
River. See United States v. Bellingham Bay Boom Co., 176 U.S. 211 (1900). The no
compensation rule was solidified in Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364
(1907), where the Court held that state authorization of an obstruction was no
impediment to Congress' removing of that obstruction without compensation,
pursuant to its navigation servitude. Id. at 400-01; see also Louisville Bridge Co. v.
United States, 242 U.S. 409 (1917) (applying no compensation rule to situation
involving previous congressional authorization). See generally Morreale, supra note
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previously, in Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States,
which was argued only eleven days after Illinois Central, the
Court had required the United States to pay just compensation
where Congress had condemned a lock and dam along the
Monongahela River which had been legislatively authorized by
Pennsylvania.132
The non-existence of the no compensation rule at the time
Illinois Central was decided is odd, therefore, only if one accepts
the common historical account of the public trust doctrine and the
navigation servitude discussed above. -In reality, the common
account of the doctrines is based on two key fictions which shed
light on why the no compensation rule had not been adopted:
first, the common account partially errs in its description of the
Crown's power; second, and much more importantly, it wholly
fails to consider Parliament's power. 3 ' The suggestion that the
Crown could not alienate the public trust is only partially true.
In fact, the pre-Revolution common law in England was that the
Crown was only presumed to hold land under navigable Water in
trust for the people; the Crown could defeat that presumption by
a clear and unequivocal grant."3 And, however unjust it may
have been, the Crown conveyed into private ownership almost all
of the land under navigable water in England, as well as numer-
115, at 32-33 (discussing origin and development of no compensation rule); Richard
W. Bartke, Navigation Servitude and Just Compensation-Struggle for a Doctrine,
48 OR. L. REV. 1 (1968); Bruce H. Johnson, Enforcing the Federal Water Resource
Servitude on Submerged and Riparian Lands, 1977 DUKE L.J. 347.
132. 148 U.S. 312, 336 (1893) (Monongahela). The obstructions and improve-
ments were also impliedly authorized by the United States which had appropriated
funds for the improvement of the river. See id. at 334-35. This approval was
emphasized in subsequent cases adopting the no compensation rule in an effort to
distinguish Monongahela as an estoppel case. See Greenleaf Johnson Lumber Co.
v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251, 265-66 (1915); Morreale, supra note 115, at 32 (citing
additional cases). But reading the opinion makes it clear that the key factor
necessitating compensation was not the United States' invitation to build but
Pennsylvania's authorization.
133. See Gough v. Bell, 22 N.J.L. 441, 457-58 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1850) ("The
objection to an alienation of the public domain by the king is, that he is but a trustee
of the community. But the legislature are not mere trustees of common rights for the
people.... The act of the legislature is the act of the people."), aff 'd, 23 N.J.L. 624
(N.J. 1852).
134. See generally Rasband, supra note 6, at 8-25 (exploring the origins of the
public trust doctrine); Glenn J. MacGrady, The Navigability Concept in the Civil and
Common Law: Historical Development, Current Importance, and Some Doctrines
That Don't Hold Water, 3 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 513 (1975) (same); Deveney, supra note
86, at 41-66 (same).
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ous fisheries. '35 The only limitation on the Crown's power was
that the Crown could not deny the public right of navigation,
which was the extent of the jus publicum about which so much
has been said. 3 ' So, even operating on the assumption that upon
the Revolution the states inherited the power of the Crown, they
would have inherited the right to convey land under navigable
water and several fisheries subject only to the public's right of
navigation.
But the states inherited more than simply the right, title,
interest, and powers of the Crown, they also inherited the power
of the Parliament. And there had never been any question that
the Parliament, as representative of the people, could convey land
under navigable water, grant several fisheries, and extinguish
any public right of passage.'37 Thus, each state was free not only
to alienate its land under navigable water and grant several
fisheries 3 ' but also to extinguish public rights of passage.139
135. See Rasband, supra note 6, at 9-10.
136. See id. at 10 n.25 (discussing extent of jus publicum). The whole division
of property into a jus privatuin and a jus publicum is a product of describing the
Crown's unique interest in land under navigable water. The terms exist because of
the monarchical system. Accordingly, their application to describe the right, title,
and interest of the American states is inaccurate and only leads to confusion.
137. See sources cited infra notes 138-39 for authority regarding Parliament's
power.
138. See JOSEPH ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PROPERTY IN TIDE
WATERS AND IN THE SOILS AND SHORES THEREOF 107 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1983)
(1826) ("If the public right of fishery then, in an arm of the sea, is subservient to the
will and power of parliament in England, it must, on the same principle, be
subservient to the will and power of the legislatures in this country."); 1 HENRY P.
FARNHAM, THE LAW OF WATER AND WATER RIGHTS § 44, at 213 (1904) ('There were
no limitations upon the right to grant several fisheries, because the limitation which
existed upon the power of the Crown was effected simply by transferring the power
to Parliament, and the states had succeeded to all the power of Parliament.").
139. See, e.g., Langdon v. Mayor of New York, 93 N.Y. 129, 155 (1883) ("In
England Parliament had complete and absolute control over all the navigable waters
within the kingdom .... and could interrupt and absolutely destroy navigation in
them."); HUMPHREY W. WOOLRYCH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERS 272 (1853)
("It was never doubted that an act of Parliament would operate to extinguish any
public right of passage ...."); Michael L. Rosen, Public and Private Ownership
Rights in Lands Under Navigable Waters: The Governmental/Proprietary
Distinction, 34 U. FLA. L. REV. 561, 569 (1982) (suggesting that the "rights of
navigation and fishery... could only be conveyed by Parliament"); Deveney, supra
note 86, at 50 ("[T]here has never been a doctrine of public trust in England. What
the king alone might not be able to do after 1701 has never been beyond the power
of the king and Parliament together to do, or beyond the power of Parliament
alone."); Gough v. Bell, 22 N.J.L. 441, 457-58 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1850), aff'd, 23 N.J.L.
624 (N.J. 1852); The King v. Montague, 107 Eng. Rep. 1183 (K.B. 1825); ALLEN S.
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Upon the ratification of the Constitution, the states gave to the
federal government the right to regulate commerce and with it
the power to protect the public's ability to navigate in furtherance
of commerce. 4 ' The states kept for themselves all remaining
right, title, and interest in their land under navigable water. The
people of each state were free to do as they wished with their land
under navigable water subject to the federal power to limit those
activities in the name of protecting commerce. 4'
The case law on the navigation servitude prior to Illinois
Central largely bears out this historical picture. Although the
federal government had been given the power to regulate
commerce, and therefore navigation, it made no broad effort to do
so.' 42 And in the absence of federal legislation, each state was
free to authorize obstructions to navigable streams.'43 The
WISDOM, THE LAW OF RIVERS AND WATERCOURSES 63 (2d ed. 1970). See generally
Rasband, supra note 6, at 8-25 (exploring the origins of the public trust doctrine).
140. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; supra note 129. That the United States had the
power to protect navigation does not necessarily mean that it could protect
navigation without paying compensation. See infra note 146 (discussing this issue).
Congress' power to act is separate and distinct from its obligation to compensate.
Congress, for example, has power to pass laws under the Commerce Clause but still
has the obligation to pay just compensation when those laws go "too far" and effect
a taking. See Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (Holmes, J.);
see also United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950) (requiring
compensation where the United States, pursuant to its power to spend for the
general welfare, destroyed certain state-law riparian rights); International Paper Co.
v. United States, 282 U.S. 399 (1931) (requiring compensation where the United
States, acting pursuant to its war power, took a person's right to use water in a
power canal).
141. See infra notes 143-47 and accompanying text; see also Gilman v.
Philadelphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713, 725-26 (1865) (The states retain all regulatory
powers "but such as they have surrendered. The power to authorize the building of
bridges is not to be found in the Federal Constitution. It has not been taken from the
States. It must reside somewhere. They had it before the Constitution was adopted,
and they have it still.").
142. See generally Johnson, supra note 131, at 349 (discussing the lack of
Congressional regulation of navigation throughout the nineteenth century). In the
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1890, Congress passed general legislation
prohibiting the creation of obstructions to navigable waters, unless the obstruction
was "affirmatively authorized by law." Act of Sept. 19, 1890, ch. 907, § 10, 26 Stat.
426, 454. But even in that Act, the reference to obstructions "authorized by law" was
taken to include obstructions authorized by state law. See United States v.
Bellingham Bay Boom Co., 176 U.S. 211 (1900). Thus, it was not until the Rivers
and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899 that Congress required congressional
authorization to build an obstruction. See Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of
1899, ch. 425, § 10, 30 Stat. 1121, 1151.
143. See Willson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829)
(Marshall, C.J.) (affirming Delaware's power to authorize the damming of a
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primary exception, which the Court articulated but did not seem
to apply, involved situations where state interference with navi-
gation was repugnant to the dormant Commerce Clause. In such
cases, a state was without authority to approve an obstruction,
even though Congress had not spoken.'44 Although the Court
always insisted that Congress continued to have plenary power
over state-authorized obstructions and improvements, 145 prior to
Illinois Central the Court had not suggested that Congress' power
could be exercised without regard for the Fifth Amendment. 146
navigable creek because no federal legislation on the subject had been enacted by
Congress pursuant to the Commerce Clause and the act was not "repugnant to the
power to regulate commerce in its dormant state"); Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v.
Hatch, 125 U.S. 1, 8 (1888) ("[T]here is no common law of the United States which
prohibits obstructions and nuisances in navigable rivers."); Gilman, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.)
at 728-31 (same).
144. See Blackbird Creek, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 252 (affirming Delaware's power
to authorize the damming of a navigable creek because Delaware's act was not
"repugnant to the power to regulate commerce in its dormant state"); South Carolina
State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 184-85 (1938) (holding that the
constitutional grant to Congress of power to regulate interstate commerce operates
of its own force to curtail state power where the state regulation would either
discriminate against out-of-state interests or unduly burden the free flow of
commerce among the states). See generally Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent,
The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism, 1987
DUKE L.J. 569, 574-81 (tracing origins of dormant Commerce Clause). The dormant
Commerce Clause idea provides the best explanation for the intermittent emphasis
in the case law that a state was being allowed to authorize obstructions to intrastate
navigable waters. See Escanaba Co. v. Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 686-87 (1882) (holding
that it is within a state's power to regulate the erection of obstructions in navigable
streams wholly within its limits "until congress should interfere and by appropriate
legislation control the matter"); Pound v. Turck, 95 U.S. 459, 462-64 (1877); Gilman,
70 U.S. (3 Wall.) at 732 ('The river, being wholly within her limits, we cannot say the
State has exceeded the bounds of her authority."); Blackbird Creek, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.)
at 252 (affirming Delaware's power to authorize the damming of a small intrastate
navigable creek).
145. See, e.g., Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 335
(1893) (citing cases); Willamette Iron Bridge Co., 125 U.S. at 12-13 ("[W]hen Congress
chooses to act, it is not concluded by anything that the States, or that individuals by
its authority or acquiescence, have done, from assuming entire control of the
matter."); Escanaba, 107 U.S. at 683 ("[U]ntil Congress acts on the subject, the power
of the State over bridges across its navigable streams is plenary."); Pound, 95 U.S.
at 464; Wisconsin v. Duluth, 96 U.S. 379, 383 (1877).
146. See Monongahela, 148 U.S. at 336 ("[L]ike the other powers granted to
Congress by the Constitution, the power to regulate commerce is subject to all the
limitations imposed by such instrument, and among them is that of the Fifth
Amendment."). The only hint that Congress would not be obligated to pay
compensation for removal of a state-authorized obstruction can be found in the
various references to Congress' power under the dormant Commerce Clause and the
Court's emphasis on state authority to approve obstructions to intrastate streams.
See supra note 144. These references left open the possibility that if a state
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Thus, as a historical matter, it is not hard to comprehend the
disparity between the public trust doctrine and the navigation
servitude: the public trust doctrine was simply the first of the two
doctrines to be sundered from its historical moorings.'47
Justice Field's individual view on compensation in navigation
servitude cases is somewhat perplexing. Although he joined the
unanimous opinion in Monongahela requiring the United States
authorized an obstruction that discriminated against out-of-state interests or
severely hindered interstate commerce, the federal government could assert that the
authorization was ultra vires and thus not subject to compensation upon its removal.
This is arguably the reasoning behind Justice Lurton's suggestion for the circuit
court in Scranton v. Wheeler, 57 F. 803 (6th Cir. 1893), rev'd, 163 U.S. 703 (1895),
that state authorized obstructions to intrastate streams are distinct from
obstructions to interstate streams because the former can only be taken for public
uses upon just compensation. See Scranton v. Wheeler, 179 U.S. 141, 146 (1900)
(Harlan, J.) (describing Justice Lurton's view). This view pointed the way toward a
more limited navigation servitude, but it has not been adopted. Although the
Supreme Court has made clear that the navigation servitude is not co-extensive with
Congress' power over navigation, see Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164,
171 (1979), the servitude does not appear to have been limited to interstate rivers.
See, e.g., United States v. Commodore Park, Inc., 324 U.S. 386, 389 (1945) (applying
the no compensation rule to Mason Creek, a navigable tidewater extending four to
five miles inland); Greenleaf Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison, 237 U.S. 251 (1915)
(applying the rule to Elizabeth River wholly within Virginia). But see Kaiser Aetna,
444 U.S. at 175 (stating that the servitude grows out of "the important public
interest in the flow of interstate waters that in their natural condition are in fact
capable of supporting public navigation") (emphasis added). See generally Boone v.
United States, 944 F.2d 1489, 1495 (9th Cir. 1991) (exploring the differences between
Congress' power over navigation and its navigation servitude); WATERS, supra note
2, § 35.02(c)(2) (same). In some sense then, the growth of the no compensation rule
can be viewed as a broadening of the reach of Congress' power under the dormant
Commerce Clause to include even potential interference with interstate commerce,
although it goes even further than that because it denies compensation even in cases
where a federal license has been issued. See, e.g., United States v. Chandler-Dunbar
Water Power Co., 229 U.S. 53, 68 (1913) (compensation denied despite the Secretary
of Army's issuance of license under the Rivers and Harbors Act).
147. Professor Morreale, now Hanks, who has written the leading article on the
navigation servitude would surely disagree with the suggestion that the no
compensation rule was a departure from history. In her view, it was the
Monongahela decision (where compensation was awarded) that was aberrational.
See Morreale, supra note 115, at 32 ("In view of the already then accepted idea of
navigation as the historically paramount public right, Monongahela was erroneously
decided."). But Professor Morreale's view of an historically paramount public right
is based on the mistaken historical account described in the text above, particularly
in the sense that the rights of the states over navigation are equated with those of
the Crown. See id. at 25-31. It also seems to be based on the mistaken view that
references to Congress' plenary power over'navigation obstructions authorized by
state law were an expression of immunity from compensation. See supra note 146
(discussing this issue).
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to pay compensation for the exercise of its navigation servitude, 148
he seemed to have articulated a different view on the compensa-
tion issue some years prior in a vigorous dissent in Bridge Co. v.
United States.149 In Bridge, Kentucky and Ohio had enacted
legislation giving the company authority to build a bridge across
the Ohio River.'5 ° Congress also approved the bridge but, in the
authorizing resolution, reserved "the right to withdraw the assent
hereby given in case the free navigation of said river shall at any
time be substantially and materially obstructed by any bridge to
be erected under the authority of this resolution ....""'' While
the bridge was being constructed, Congress declared that the
bridge would be unlawful absent changes. 15 2 The company made
the changes and then sued the United States which had con-
sented to waive its immunity.'53 Relying on Congress' reserva-
tion, the majority denied compensation to the company.5 4
In dissent, Field argued that the United States should pay
compensation.'55 He asserted two grounds, the second of which
is particularly interesting in light of his compensation suggestion
in Illinois Central. Field first argued that Fifth Amendment
compensation was due. But he did not contend, as did the
Monongahela Court, that Congress' plenary power over naviga-
tion was subject to the Fifth Amendment. '56 Instead, he argued
that Congress did not have the power to order the changes
because the bridge-was "lawful when erected, and in no way
interfere[d] with the navigation of the river."'57 Congress' initial
assent to construction, he concluded, insulated the company from
any claim by Congress that the bridge interfered with
navigation.5 8 Although he suggested Fifth Amendment compen-
148. See Monongahela, 148 U.S. at 312. The Monongahela case was decided
after Illinois Central but, as stated above, was argued a mere 11 days following
Illinois Central. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
149. 105 U.S. 470 (1882).
150. See id. at 470-71.
151. Id. at 473.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 475.
154. See id. at 484.
155. See 105 U.S. at 500-01.
156. See supra note 146 (discussing Monongahela).
157. 105 U.S. at 494 (emphasis added).
158. See id. at 494-95. To reach this conclusion, Field had to overlook the
Court's prior holdings that Congress had plenary authority to determine what
interfered with or improved navigation. See South Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4
(1876) (Congress could obstruct navigation in one place to improve it in another);
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sation was appropriate, the negative implication of Field's
reasoning was that Congress could take without compensation a
state-authorized project that did interfere with navigation. Thus,
putting aside Monongahela, Field's view on the no compensation
rule was perhaps not that far from his view on the public trust
doctrine. The sovereign could remove obstructions without
paying Fifth Amendment compensation if a court, presumably as
a matter of federal common law,159 decided that the obstruction
interfered with the public's right to navigate. 6 °
The coincidence of Field's views on the two doctrines is even
more apparent in the second ground Field proffered for paying the
company compensation. In a passage foreshadowing his compen-
sation suggestion in Illinois Central he stated:
It is not necessary, however, in order to charge the govern-
ment with the expenditures forced upon the company, to rely
upon this provision of the Constitution, further than to show
the general spirit which should control the government in its
legislation affecting the property of individuals. There is a
general principle of justice pervading our laws, and the laws
of all free governments, which requires that whoever unlaw-
fully and wrongfully imposes upon another the necessity of an
unusual expenditure of money or labor or materials for the
protection and preservation of his property, shall make
complete indemnity for the expenditure. The principle applies
as fully to the acts of the government as to those of individu-
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 431 (1855)
("The regulation of commerce includes.., the power to determine what shall or shall
not be deemed in judgment of law an obstruction to navigation.").
159. Field's dissent appears to operate on the presumption that the judiciary
would be the arbiter of whether an obstruction so materially interfered with
navigation as to be within Congress' power to remove it. See 105 U.S. at 490-97
(Field, J., dissenting). And Field apparently envisioned relatively rigorousjudicial
scrutiny of whether a particular obstruction truly interfered with commerce. See id.
at 496 ("[B]y 'free navigation' is not meant a navigation entirely clear of
obstructions."). This conclusion disregarded the Court's prior decisions suggesting
Congress had plenary power to define what constituted an obstruction to navigation.
See supra note 158 (citing cases).
160. Field's position that Congress could avoid Fifth Amendment compensation
only when it acted to remove an obstruction that materially interfered with
navigation can also be viewed as an assertion of Congress' dormant Commerce
Clause power over navigation. See supra notes 144-46 and accompanying text
(discussing this issue). In the absence of congressional legislation, states could only
traduce the Commerce Clause if there were a material interference with an
interstate stream.
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als; and wherever suits can be brought in the tribunals of the
country, such indemnity can be enforced.
161
Field's view, therefore, was that compensation was owed as a
matter of natural law whenever an individual incurred expendi-
tures in reliance upon the sovereign. As far as Field was con-
cerned, the Bridge Company should receive compensation for the
cost of the changes to the bridge whether or not the Fifth
Amendment applied.
In light of his Bridge dissent, Field's suggestion that Illinois
was obligated to pay for the Railroad's improvements is at least
consistent with his view of the navigation servitude. In both
instances, even if constitutional protections for property were not
applicable, compensation for expenditures made in reliance upon
the grant was still appropriate as a matter of equity-namely,
that "general principle of justice pervading our laws, and the laws
of all free governments." '62 Although the navigation servitude is
now construed to obviate any obligation to pay compensation for
improvements, 16 the public trust doctrine has not yet taken that
route. One of the purposes of this article, of course, is to suggest
that it should not.
D. Awarding Equitable Compensation Against the
Sovereign
Whatever the source of equitable compensation, one question
that must be addressed is why Field concluded that compensation
could be awarded against the state. As Field stated in Bridge, the
basic principle of equitable indemnity could be enforced only
"wherever suits can be brought in the tribunals of the country.' '164
Because the public trust doctrine is state common law,' 65 the
effort to enforce equitable compensation against the state will
typically arise in state court. The common law of sovereign
immunity is, however, that no suit, in law or equity, may be
161. 105 U.S. at 503 (Field, J., dissenting). In Bridge, the United States had
waived its immunity from suit. See supra text accompanying note 153.
162. Id. at 503 (Field, J., dissenting).
163. See supra notes 119-23 and accompanying text.
164. 105 U.S. at 503 (Field, J., dissenting).
165. See sup.ra note 9; see also supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text
(explaining the since-rejected reasoning for removing the Illinois Central case to
federal court).
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maintained against a state in state court unless the state has
given its consent to suit.166 This immunity includes suits which
involve a property interest of the state, such as actions to quiet
title.167  Unlike modern public trust cases, of course, Illinois
Central was a federal court case. And in federal court, a state
enjoys not only any substantive immunity afforded by state law
but also the immunity offered by the Eleventh Amendment. 8'
Thus, to award equitable compensation against a state in
either state or federal court, there must be state consent to suit. 169
A state may consent to suit by a couple of different means. A
state may waive its immunity, or a part of its immunity, by
statute or in the state constitution. 7 ° Alternatively, a long-
166. See, e.g., Kenneth J. Wilbur, Comment, Concurrent Jurisdiction and
Attorney's Fees: The Obligation of State Courts to Hear Section 1983 Claims, 134 U.
PA. L. REV. 1207, 1228 (1986); Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other
Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 538-39 (1978); 72
AM. JUR. 2D States, Territories, and Dependencies §§ 99-101 (1974).
167. See 72 AM. JuR. 2D States, Territories, and Dependencies § 100 (1974). Cf.
Idaho v. Coeur D'Alene Tribe, 117 S. Ct. 2028 (1997) (recognizing Eleventh
Amendment immunity for states, even from the Ex Parte Young exception for suits
against state officials, from claims in the nature of quiet title actions).
168. Under the Eleventh Amendment, a federal court generally has no
jurisdiction to award damages against a state, even for constitutional violations. See
generally Field, supra note 166. The Eleventh Amendment, however, has been
construed not to prohibit a federal court from issuing injunctive relief against state
officials. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. at 123. And that is true even if the injunction
against a state official will require a state to pay out money from its treasury in the
future. See Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). But suits for retrospective
monetary relief are not allowed. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
Compensation for improvements would seemingly be a form of retrospective
monetary relief.
169. Absent consent, sovereign .immunity could only be avoided if it were
derived solely from the common law and the court decided to eliminate the protection
it had itself created. See generally Note, Governmental Immunity-The Doctrine of
Immunity Judicially Abrogated and Legislatively Reinstated, 50 J. URB. L. 154 (1972)
(discussing that if a state's sovereign immunity is a product of its common law, and
not a result of legislation or the state constitution, a state court, as part of the
common-law process, may limit sovereign immunity); see also infra note 182 (citing
cases).
170. See Annotation, Consent to Suit Against State, 42 A.L.R. 1464 (1926)
(citing multitude of cases finding consent in state constitutions and statutes); Wilbur,
supra note 166, at 1229 ("Under a common law theory of sovereign immunity, the
state courts, the state legislatures, the federal courts, and Congress may limit a
state's sovereign immunity."). State consent to suit in state court does not
necessarily constitute consent to suit in federal court. See Florida Dep't of Health
& Rehabilitative Servs. v. Florida Nursing Home Ass'n, 450 U.S. 147, 149-50 (1981);
Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 441 (1900). State consent to suit in federal court
must be express. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985)
(establishing that for a state statute or constitutional provision to constitute a waiver
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standing common-law limitation on sovereign immunity is the
rule that when the state itself files suit, it consents to counter-
claims for set-off or recoupment 71 which are connected with the
same transaction or subject of the action. 172 This principle has
been held to apply to counterclaims for quiet title to which a
sovereign is typically immune. 7 1 It has also been held that by
filing suit a state waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity with
respect to recoupment counterclaims. 174 This rule of consent by
of Eleventh Amendment immunity, "it must specify the State's intention to subject
itself to suit in federal court."); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 673 (1974)
("Constructive consent is not a doctrine commonly associated with the surrender of
constitutional rights, and we see no place for it here.").
171. Defined accurately, "set-off" is a "counter-claim demand which defendant
holds against plaintiff arising out of a transaction extrinsic of plaintiff's cause of
action." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 372 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added).
"Recoupment," by contrast, is not necessarily a counterclaim but a reduction or
rebate by the defendant of part of the plaintiff's claim because of a right in the
defendant arising out of the same transaction. See id. at 1275. Strictly speaking,
therefore, by filing suit a state only consents to claims for recoupment and not set-off.
Because courts have tended to use the terms loosely, and in some cases
interchangeably, it is less important to focus on the name given recovery and better
to analyze whether the counterclaim or defense arises out of, or is connected with,
the same transaction or occurrence. Indeed, some jurisdictions have dissolved
entirely the distinction between set-off and recoupment for pleading purposes. See
generally 20 AM. JUR. 2D Counterclaim, Recoupment, and Setoff § 96 (1995).
172. See, e.g., 72 AM. JUR. 2D States, Territories, and Dependencies § 95 (1974)
("[A] state, by bringing an equitable action, opens the door to any defense or cross
complaint germane to the matter in controversy."); Annotation, Consent to Suit
Against State, 42 A.L.R. 1464, 1480-83 (1926) (citing cases); 20 AM. JUR. 2D,
Counterclaim, Recoupment, and Setoff § 61 (1995) (same); Note, Counterclaims
Against a Sovereign, 36 HARv. L. REV. 871, 872 (1923) (same); United States v.
Ringgold, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 150, 163-64 (1834) (waiver of immunity to claims arising
out of same transaction); United States v. Lindberg Corp., 686 F. Supp. 701, 704
(E.D. Wis. 1987), aff'd, 882 F.2d 1158 (7th Cir. 1989); Commonwealth v. Todd, 72 Ky.
(9 Bush) 708, 716 (1873); State v. Schurz, 173 N.W. 408 (Minn. 1919); Port Royal &
A.R. Co. v. South Carolina, 60 F. 552 (C.C.D. S.C. 1894). Recoupment counterclaims
are denied, however, where they arise out of a separate transaction than the one
sued upon by the state. E.g., People v. Corner, 12 N.Y.S. 936 (N.Y Sup. Ct. 1891),
aff'd, 29 N.E. 147 (N.Y. 1891).
173. Although a state is generally immune from quiet title suits, several courts
have held that when a state brings a suit attacking title, the defendant may set up
his title and have the title claim litigated. See, e.g., Brundage v. Knox, 117 N.E. 123
(Ill. 1917); State v. Portsmouth Say. Bank, 7 N.E. 379, 396 (Ind. 1886); Texas
Channel & Dock Co. v. State, 135 S.W. 522 (Tex. 1911); Fulton Light, Heat & Power
Co. v. State, 116 N.Y.S. 1000 (N.Y. Ct. Cl. 1909).
174. See 3 JEREMY WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 13.50[4]
(1997) ("By filing suit a state also waives its Eleventh Amendment immunity...
with respect to compulsory counterclaims asserted defensively in recoupment for
purposes of diminishing state's recovery. The waiver does not extend to permissive
counterclaims or to claims seeking an affirmative judgment."); Clark v. Barnard, 108
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filing suit would thus seem to cover the situation in Illinois
Central. When Illinois filed its bill in equity against the Railroad,
it was effectively consenting to any connected counterclaim for
recoupment by the Railroad.'75 If Field's reasoning with regard
to his compensation suggestion is attributed to this line of
authority, it presents no conflict with sovereign immunity.
Attributing such reasoning to Field, however, has at least two
potential difficulties. An initial problem is that the rule that a
state's filing suit waives sovereign immunity to recoupment
counterclaims has not always been applied in public lands cases.
Several courts have held, both before and after Illinois Central,
that mistaken improvers on public lands are not entitled to
compensation for improvements because of sovereign
immunity. 7 ' And, in some instances, those that have recognized
U.S. 436, 448 (1883) ("State ... appeared in the cause and presented and prosecuted
a claim to the fund in controversy, and thereby made itself a party to the litigation
to the full extent required for its complete determination."); Woelffer v. Happy States
of Am., Inc., 626 F. Supp. 499, 502 (N.D. Ill. 1985) ("[F]or a court to find an implicit
waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity, the court must make two findings: first,
that the counterclaim arises from the same event; and second, that the counterclaim
is defensive, typically in the nature of recoupment.").
175. One problem with this consent theory, in addition to those discussed below,
see infra notes 176-80 and accompanying text, is that Illinois did not consent to
federal court jurisdiction. It opposed removal to federal court. See supra note 26 and
accompanying text. Although its objection was to federal question jurisdiction, see
id., it perhaps could also have objected to removal on Eleventh Amendment grounds,
at least under current law. Although removal of claims barred by the Eleventh
Amendment is generally precluded, see, e.g., Kruse v. Hawaii, 68 F.3d 331, 334 (9th
Cir. 1995), there is some dispute in the district courts whether removing an action
commenced by the state in state court even implicates the Eleventh Amendment
which, by its words, applies to a "suit... against one of the United States." Compare
California v. Steelcase, Inc., 792 F. Supp. 84, 86 (C.D. Cal. 1992) (Eleventh
Amendment applies), with Banco y Agencia de Financiamiento de la Vivienda de P.
R. v. Urbanizadora Villalba, 681 F. Supp. 981, 982-83 (D. Puerto Rico 1988)
(Eleventh Amendment does not apply), To the extent the Eleventh Amendment
applied to the action, Illinois' failure to assert its immunity could be viewed as
waiving it. See In re Secretary of the Dep't of Crime Control & Pub. Safety, 7 F.3d
1140, 1148 (4th Cir. 1993) (discussing how "[u]nder certain circumstances, a state
named as a defendant in an action in federal court may waive its Eleventh
Amendment immunity by voluntarily making a general appearance in that action
and defending it on the merits"). Without belaboring this speculation, to the extent
a case is removed to federal court without the state's consent, there is a significant
chance that the state would retain its Eleventh Amendment immunity.
176. See Swetman v. Sanders, 20 S.W. 124, 126-27 (Tex. 1892) ('The land being
vacant and the property of the state, at the time when the improvements were made,
the state could not have been required, through the instrumentality of the courts, to
make compensation for such improvements, in the absence of a statute authorizing
such relief."); Hiatt v. Brooks, 22 N.W. 73 (Neb. 1885) (no compensation for
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the equitable concerns of mistaken improvers have given the
improver only the right to remove the improvements but not the
right to demand compensation."' A second problem with
grounding the compensation suggestion in state consent to
recoupment counterclaims is that the Illinois Constitution made
the state immune from all suits in law or equity.1 78 To the extent
this provision included recoupment counterclaims,' 79 Illinois
seemingly would have been immune from any counterclaim for
compensation.'o
improvements placed on tract in unsuccessful effort to hold track under preemption
and homestead laws); Bradford v. United States, 47 Ct. Cl. 141, 146 (1911) ("[T]he
Government, in the absence of statutory authority therefor, can not be held
responsible for improvements made on the public lands of the United States."). See
Annotation, Rights as Between Adverse Claimants to Improvements Placed on Public
Lands, 6 A.L.R. 95 (1920) (stating that by the "weight of authority, the purchaser
from the government is entitled to improvements... as being part of the real estate,
and a person making improvements on public lands has no right thereto as against
the grantee of the government."). These cases denying compensation are generally
distinguishable from public trust cases, however, because the occupant of the public
lands did not take the land under color of title. Moreover, in other instances,
compensation for improvements has been allowed. See Flint & Pere Marquette Ry.
Co. v. Gordon, 2 N.W. 648 (Mich. 1879) (compensation for improvements when land
was appropriated by railroad before patent received); Wells v. Riley, 29 F. Cas. 675
(C.C.D. Iowa 1872) (No. 17,404); Litchfield v. Johnson, 15 F. Cas. 590 (C.C.D. Iowa
1877) (No. 8387). See Annotation, supra at 100 (citing cases establishing "some
conflict in the authorities as to whether persons making improvements on public
lands which are subsequently acquired by another are entitled to compensation for
the improvements, under Occupying Claimant's Acts.").
177. See Wallbrecht v. Blush, 95 P. 927, 928 (Colo. 1908) (mistaken occupier of
public domain given reasonable time in which to remove improvements); Bingham
County Agric. Ass'n v. Rogers, 59 P. 931, 931-32 (Idaho 1900) (same); Winans v.
Beidler, 52 P. 405, 405-06 (Okla, 1898) (same); Richardson v. Bohney, 114 P. 42
(Idaho 1911) (recognizing mistaken improver's right to harvest crops mistakenly
planted on public land).
178. Article IV, section 26 of the 1870 Illinois Constitution states: "The State
of Illinois shall never be made defendant in any court of law or equity." In 1970, the
Illinois Constitution was amended to abolish sovereign immunity. See ILL. CONST.
art. 13, § 4.
179. An answer to this question is not apparent from a review of Illinois case
law, although in 1904, the Illinois Supreme Court did rule that only the legislature
and not the Attorney General could waive the State's immunity, see People v.
Sanitary Dist. of Chicago, 71 N.E. 334 (Ill. 1904), suggesting that filing suit would
not waive the State's constitutional immunity. On the other hand, the same court
said that where the legislature authorized suit, sovereign immunity might be waived.
See id.
180. Under current law, a third potential difficulty with overcoming sovereign
immunity could arise. Some courts have suggested that the sovereign only waives
its immunity to recoupment counterclaims that seek relief of the same kind or
nature. Under this reasoning, where the sovereign seeks equitable relief in the form
of quiet title or rescission, as would often happen in a public trust case, the sovereign
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In the event that Illinois would have been immune from a
recoupment counterclaim, why did Field suggest compensation?
Again, the same two interpretive approaches to Field's opinion
exist-either compensation was merely instrumentalist or it was
intended to be part and parcel of the public trust doctrine. Under
the instrumentalist reading, Field knew that Illinois enjoyed
sovereign immunity but he also knew that Illinois should
typically have been subject to a Fourteenth Amendment takings
claim. According to this view, although the law Field stated was
incorrect in both of its particulars, he accepted the contradiction
because it accomplished his view of justice. There is more than
a hint of this in Field's natural law argument in Bridge."'
Again, however, if compensation is viewed as part and parcel
of the public trust doctrine, the case for circumventing sovereign
immunity is stronger. First, to the extent the public trust
doctrine does not exist independent of a compensation obligation,
Field's suggestion can be read as articulating the contours of the
State's immunity. Where immunity is a creature of judicial
creation, courts plainly have the power to abrogate that immu-
nity."8 2 Illinois' immunity with respect to the public trust doctrine
would still be immune to a recoupment claim for monetary compensation. See, e.g.,
United States v. Ameco Elec. Corp., 224 F. Supp. 783, 786 (E.D.N.Y. 1963) ("The
Government here is not seeking a judgment for a sum of money but is asserting title
to certain chattels. The very nature of the action makes it impossible to reduce or
discharge the claim by recoupment or setoff."); United States v. 2116 Boxes of Boned
Beef, 726 F.2d 1481 (10th Cir. 1984) (rejecting defendant's recoupment counterclaim
against the United States' seizure action). See 3 MOORE, supra note 174 § 13.50[2][c]
(1997); cf. id § 13.50[4] (stating that a state only consents to waive its Eleventh
Amendment immunity with respect to compulsory counterclaims). By contrast,
"other courts have rejected the narrow view that the recoupment claim must be
identical to that sought by the government." United States v. Iron Mountain Mines,
Inc., 812 F. Supp. 1528, 1551 (E.D. Cal. 1992). The refusal of some courts to view a
counterclaim for money damages as of the same kind as a claim for control of a
chattel is a type of formalism that is hardly warranted in a general climate of
declining solicitude for sovereign immunity. It also resurrects the distinction
between law and equity which has largely departed with the merger of the two in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See supra note 15. Money damages, moreover, can
be a form of equitable relief. See, e.g., Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196-97 (1974)
(discussing how back pay in Title VII cases is an equitable remedy, a form of
restitution). It should not matter what type of relief the claim or counterclaim seeks
as long as the two claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence.
181. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
182. In Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302, 163 N.E.2d 89
(Ill. 1959), for example, the Illinois Supreme Court abrogated the immunity for
school districts which it had created in an extension of the 1870 state Constitutional
grant of State immunity. The court emphasized:
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was indeed a judicial creation. In both the State and federal
constitutions, Illinois had consented to be sued for just compensa-
tion whenever it took private property for public use.183 In effect,
Field's creation of the public trust doctrine was a common-law
grant of immunity to the State by which it avoided a suit to which
it had otherwise consented. Thus, if compensation is part of the
public trust doctrine, the whole doctrine can simply be viewed as
a limited grant of common-law immunity. To the extent a court
creates a common-law doctrine that benefits the state, nothing
should prevent the court from articulating the contours of that
doctrine to reduce the windfall.
Viewing compensation as part and parcel of the public trust
doctrine also avoids sovereign immunity for a second, and closely
related, reason. When compensation is understood as an element
of the state's public trust claim, the grantee's right to compensa-
tion can be viewed as part of the property right enjoyed by the
grantee, one stick in the bundle.'84 And to the extent compensa-
The doctrine of school district immunity was created by this court alone.
Having found that doctrine to be unsound and unjust under present
conditions, we consider that we have not only the power, but the duty, to
abolish that immunity. We closed our courtroom doors without legislative
help, and we can likewise open them.
Id. at 25 (internal quotations and citation omitted); see also Stone v. Arizona
Highway Comm'n, 381 P.2d 107 (Ariz. 1963) ("[T]he doctrine of sovereign immunity
was originally judicially created. We are now convinced that a court-made rule,
when unjust or outmoded, does not necessarily become with age invulnerable to
judicial attack. This doctrine having been engrafted upon Arizona law by judicial
enunciation may properly be changed or abrogated by the same process."); Muskopf
v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457 (Cal. 1961); Smith v. State, 473 P.2d 937 (Idaho
1970) (abrogating sovereign immunity); Carroll v. Kittle, 457 P.2d 21 (Kan. 1969);
Jones v. State Highway Comm'n, 557 S.W.2d 225 (Mo. 1977); Johnson v. Municipal
Univ. of Omaha, 169 N.W.2d 286 (Neb. 1969) (same); Hicks v. State, 544 P.2d 1153
(N.M. 1975).
183. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see also ILL. CONST. art. I, § 15 (original
provision at ILL. CONST. art. II, § 13 (1870)) (requiring just compensation where
"[p]rivate property [is] taken or damaged for public use").
184. As an explanation of how the right to compensation can be conceptualized
as a property right of the grantee, it is useful to expand upon the hypothetical
discussed in note 111, supra. Suppose the state grants property to Yso long as Y
uses the property as a school. If Y ceases to use the property as a school, the state
may re-enter. Suppose then that the state brings an ejectment action seeking to
remove Y, despite the fact that Y is still operating a school. The court would refuse
to eject Y because the state cannot prove the condition subsequent has been met. To
the extent the state went ahead and took the property by eminent domain, the court
would surely award Ycompensation. Of course, that compensation would be limited
to the value of Ys property right, that is, the right to have a school on the property.
By analogy, if the state attempts to revoke a grant of trust resources without paying
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tion is itself a property right, it is protected by state and federal
constitutional provisions that explicitly waive sovereign immu-
nity.185 Finally, if compensation for improvements is an element
of the state's public trust claim rather than a counterclaim or
defense, sovereign immunity is avoided altogether. Where a state
seeks to revoke a prior grant of trust resources, it has the burden
of proving that it has offered or will offer the grantee compensa-
tion for improvements.
In the end, although it is difficult to identify the specific
rationale Justice Field had in mind for overcoming sovereign
immunity, to the extent he considered the issue at all, it is at
least fair to conclude that a persuasive rationale existed. The
same is true, more generally, With respect to a rationale for
awarding compensation. Although Field did not offer one,
convincing rationales were available. And among the rationales,
the most persuasive is that compensation is a necessary concomi-
tant of the public trust doctrine. This is particularly true if the
public trust doctrine is perceived, not as rendering grants of trust
resources void ab initio, but as allowing a state to make voidable
grants. In that case, compensation is simply a condition of
termination. Although the compensation obligation renders
suspect the justification for the public trust doctrine that the
grantee had notice of the underlying servitude, it fits well with
the more principled view that grantees of trust resources acted in
good faith and in reliance on the sovereign's power to make the
grant.
Having explored the validity and basis for Illinois Central's
compensation obligation, it is time now to turn to the modern
application of the compensation principle. During the last
roughly thirty years, judicial reliance upon the public trust
compensation, it has failed to satisfy a condition of termination and to go forward
would result in a taking of the grantee's property right-the right to maintain the
property until such time as equitable compensation is paid. See ROGER BERNHARDT,
REAL PROPERTY IN A NUTSHELL 214 (3d ed. 1993) ("[Ihe benefit of the condition is
itself an interest in land, and does not run with any other land. It is transferable in
its own right."). In this sense, the right to compensation is part of the grantee's
reliance interest in the background property law that cannot be undone without
resulting in a taking. Cf. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003,
1029-30 (1992) (holding that regulation that goes beyond background principles of
nuisance and property law may result in a taking). Of course, conceiving of
compensation as a property right assumes that the state's public trust easement is
itself an actual, and not a constructive, property right. See supra note 118.
185. See supra note 183.
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doctrine has burgeoned. While even Illinois Central's fictional
trust was limited to land under navigable water, the doctrine has
been expanded in some states to include water rights obtained by
prior appropriation." 6 And whereas the trust was designed to
protect navigation, commerce, and fishery, some courts have now
said that it also protects the public's interest in the recreational
and environmental values associated with navigable waters."'
With this expansion of the public trust doctrine, which has
necessarily compounded the due process problem of lack of notice
to grantees of trust resources,'88 the need for recurrence to the
compensation obligation first articulated in Illinois Central has
grown apace. Unfortunately, Field's basic message that a state
which seeks equity must do equity has largely been forgotten.
The next section argues that Field's equitable compensation
principle can, and should, be adopted by modern courts as a
matter of equity or as a common-law refinement to the public
trust doctrine itself. Alternatively, state legislatures should
require equitable compensation by statute.
186. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983)
(Mono Lake); Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441 (Idaho 1985); United Plainsmen Ass'n
v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976).
But see Gregory S. Weber, Articulating the Public Trust: Text, Near Text and Context,
27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1155, 1156 (1995) (concluding that Mono Lake's "marriage of the
public trust doctrine and the western water rights system has produced few [judicial]
offspring" and discussing administrative development of the doctrine).
187. See, e.g., Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d 374, 380 (Cal. 1971); Caminiti v.
Boyle, 732 P.2d 989, 994 (Wash. 1987) (public trust includes the right of navigation
"together with its incidental rights of fishing, boating, swimming, water skiing, and
other related recreational purposes generally regarded as corollary to the right of
navigation and the use of public waters"); Menzer v. Village of Elkhart Lake, 186
N.W.2d 290, 296 (Wis. 1971) (public trust encompasses all public uses of water). See
generally Scott Reed, The Public Trust Doctrine: Is It Amphibious? 1 ENVTL. L. &
LITIG. 107, 116-21 (1986) (collecting cases extending the public trust doctrine beyond
its traditional scope).
188. Obviously, each time the category of trust resources grows, the number of
grantees subject to potential revocation grows. Such newly burdened grantees can
only be said to be on notice if notice consists of knowledge that the public trust
doctrine is enlarging its reach. The grantee's lack of notice of the potential for state
revocation is the primary equitable flaw in the public trust doctrine. Equitable
compensation would alleviate that flaw, at least to some extent.
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II. EQUITABLE COMPENSATION UNDER THE MODERN PUBLIC
TRUST DOCTRINE
A. Courts May Award Equitable Compensation for Public
Trust Takings
Although much of the foregoing analysis of the origin of
Justice Field's compensation suggestion necessarily relied on case
law contemporaneous with the Illinois Central decision, the same
equitable doctrines remain viable tools for current courts. Equity
still allows compensation for improvements mistakenly erected in
good faith reliance on the validity of a conveyance.' 9 But
whatever the approach in current mistaken improver cases
(which are, of course, quite variable), equitable compensation in
public trust cases remains appropriate because it is best viewed
as part and parcel of the public trust doctrine. This is certainly
true as long as the public trust doctrine is viewed as allowing
states to make voidable grants of trust resources. If that is the
case, compensation for improvements is simply a condition of
voidability. Equitable compensation is built into the public trust
doctrine and is not a separate, external principle of equity that a
court must reach out to use.
Courts may adopt either approach. And regardless of
whether a court recognizes compensation for improvements as a
separate equitable counterclaim dependent upon the good faith
reliance of the grantee, or as a necessary concomitant of state
revocation of a prior grant of a trust resource, it would be a
significant and useful advance over current doctrine.
1. The Implications of the Different Approaches to
Equitable Compensation
It is nevertheless important to recognize that the two
approaches to equitable compensation are not identical. As
discussed above, for general equitable defenses or counterclaims
of mistaken improvement, good faith reliance on title is a sine qua
189. See Dickinson, supra note 57 (citing modern mistaken improver cases).
See, e.g., Mooring v. Brown, 763 F.2d 386, 387 (10th Cir. 1985) (relying on
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 42(1) (1937)); United States v. Francis, 623 F. Supp.
535, 536 (D.V.I. 1985) (same).
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non of compensation.19 ° Thus, a court that treats compensation
as a separate equitable defense will necessarily entangle itself in
a good faith inquiry with its inevitable tension between the fact
of lack of notice to the grantee and the purported justification for
the public trust doctrine that no taking has occurred because the
grantee received the trust resource subject to the state's public
trust easement. By contrast, a court that views compensation as
a component of the public trust doctrine (as an additional
constructive term of the grant or as a part of the grantee's
property right) will not expose itself to this same criticism. It also
will more easily be able to answer any sovereign immunity
objections on the part of the state.' 9'
Even if these difficulties can be overcome, the two approaches
may lead to different results. To the extent a court regards
compensation as a separate equitable defense, the number of
situations in which compensation will be awarded may be less,
particularly over time. As the use of the public trust doctrine
increases and expands, the likelihood that a court could properly
find a grantee to have had notice of the public trust easement also
grows. Accordingly, over time, the separate good faith analysis
might result in fewer and fewer cases of compensation. Where
compensation is regarded as part and parcel of the public trust
doctrine, however, notice would not be such a factor because
grantees would simply be on notice that their property right
included the right to be compensated for improvements upon
revocation of the grant.
In addition, by treating compensation as a separate equitable
defense and thereby necessitating a factual inquiry into the
grantee's good faith, a court would undermine the notion that
grants of trust resources are voidable and not void ab initio.
Specifically, where a court inquires into whether a grantee took
the trust resource with or without notice, its implicit assumption
is that the grant was void to begin with. '92 And the problem with
190. See supra notes 62-75 and accompanying text.
191. See supra Part I.D. (discussing the sovereign immunity issue).
192. If a grant is only revocable, the factual question of notice and good faith
is irrelevant. To explain, if a grantee lacked notice that a state could revoke a grant,
he would be entitled to compensation. But even if a grantee had notice of the state's
revocation power, the court would need to decide as a matter of law whether
compensation was part of the public trust doctrine. In other words, notice of the
possibility of revocation only begs the question of whether the grantee understood
that compensation would be paid upon revocation. And a decision to award
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that assumption is that it carries with it the heavy burden of
explaining the vast number of state grants of trust resources.
193
If state grants of trust resources are invalid at their inception,
why are there so many of them? On the other hand, if grants of
trust resources are merely voidable, there is at least some
foothold for an explanation of the numerous state grants. Thus,
to the extent a court seeks the intellectual shelter provided by the
voidability interpretation of the public trust doctrine, it should be
wary of addressing compensation as a separate equitable defense.
2. Awarding Equitable Compensation Where the
State Is Not the Plaintiff
Regardless of whether equitable compensation is viewed as
a condition of revocation built into the public trust doctrine or as
a separate defense, recognizing the need for equitable compensa-
tion presents a court with one additional difficulty: its jurisdiction
over public trust plaintiffs other than the state. Courts have
generally held that any person has standing to raise a claim of
harm to the public trust.1 94 As a putative beneficiary of the trust,
a citizen has an interest in preventing the state from dissipating
the corpus of the trust in a way that does not benefit the public.
Thus, even before the liberalization of standing requirements that
compensation upon revocation simply builds compensation into the public trust
doctrine. Thus, unlike the "void ab initia" interpretation of the public trust doctrine
which inquires into good faith as a matter of fact, the voidability interpretation needs
no such inquiry.
193. Arguably, the large number of conveyances could be explained by reference
to Illinois Central's suggestion that the state may make grants if the parcel conveyed
promotes the public's interest in navigation, commerce, and fishing or does not
substantially impair the public's interest in the lands and waters remaining. See 146
U.S. at 453, 455-56. Under this theory, there are few grants which actually are void
ab initio. Such a narrow view of the reach of the public trust doctrine does not,
however, fit the public trust doctrine of Mono Lake where the court indicated that the
state retained "continuing supervisory control" over all its navigable waters. See
National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709, 727 (Cal. 1983) (Mono
Lake). This supervisory notion accords much more closely with the theory that
grants of trust resources are voidable but not void.
194. See, e.g., Mono Lake, 658 P.2d at 716 n.11; Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. East Bay Mun. Util. Dist., 605 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1980); Marks v. Whitney, 491 P.2d
374, 381-82 (Cal. 1971); Paepcke v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 263 N.E.2d 11, 18 (Ill.
1970); State v. Deetz, 224 N.W.2d 407, 413 (Wis. 1974). See generally Blumm &
Schwartz, supra note 9, at 712-13 (discussing standing in public trust cases);
Lazarus, supra note 18, at 658-60 (same).
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coincided with the rise of the environmental movement, 195 the
public trust doctrine created in each member of the public a
beneficial interest that provided standing to sue. 196  Even if
private persons have standing to sue, however, a court is not
without jurisdictional concerns. If the state must pay equitable
compensation to revoke a grant of trust resources, a question
arises whether the state is a necessary and indispensable party
to public trust litigation.
Consider a public trust suit brought by a citizen alleging
harm to the public's interest by a private grantee's use of some
trust resource (an appropriative water right or land beneath a
navigable river, for example). Assuming that compensation for
the grantee is in the nature of an equitable defense or counter-
claim, how is the grantee to obtain compensation for any improve-
ments erected in reliance upon the grant? Perhaps the grantee
could file a third-party claim against the state for equitable
compensation, 197 or seek to have the state joined as a plaintiff.198
Under an alternative scenario, the grantee could seek compensa-
tion directly from the citizen plaintiff, even though the improvi-
195. Prior to the environmental movement, the Court had generally required
a plaintiff to show some harm to a legal interest in order to have Article III standing
to sue. See Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137-
38 (1939) (denying standing in the absence of a legal right, either "one of property,
one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious invasion, or one founded
on a statute which confers a privilege"); Lazarus, supra note 18, at 658-59. In the
early 1970s, however, the Court abandoned the legal interest test and merely
required that plaintiff prove an injury in fact. See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727, 739 (1972); Association of Data Processing Servs. Org., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S.
150, 153 (1970). As long as a plaintiff could show that she was asserting an interest
within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the statute or doctrine in
question-including interests in "aesthetic, conservational, and recreational as well
as economic values"-the plaintiff would have standing. Id. at 153-54 (internal
quotations and citations omitted). In more recent years, the Court has seemed to
make some effort to constrict standing in environmental cases, although even those
efforts appear to be easily navigable with a well-pleaded complaint. See Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n, 497 U.S.
871 (1990).
196. See generally supra note 194; Lazarus, supra note 18; at 658-60 (arguing
that the rise of modern standing doctrine has contributed to the obsolescence of any
need for a public trust doctrine).
197. See FED. R. CIv. P. 14 ("At any time after commencement of the action a
defending party, as a third-party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to
be served upon a person not a party to the action who is or may be liable to the third-
party plaintiff for all or part of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party
plaintiff.").
198. See, e.g., FED. R. CIv. P. 19(a) (describing circumstances under which a
person may be joined as a party in an existing action).
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dent grant was not the fault of the citizen. In a number of
mistaken improver cases, the true owner must pay compensation
to eject the mistaken improver irrespective of whether the owner
was at fault for the improver's mistake. 199 But those cases do not
fit the situation of a citizen or group bringing a public trust claim
where the plaintiff is not the sole owner of the property or even
the primary beneficiary of the trust resource. It would be odd to
force such an individual plaintiff to pay for a benefit enjoyed by
the entire public.
Assuming instead that equitable compensation is part and
parcel of the public trust doctrine-a condition of termina-
tion-how is the citizen to proceed? Unless she could pay for the
improvements herself,2"' she could not satisfy a crucial element
of the public trust claim. Thus, the citizen's first step, prior to
initiating the suit, presumably would be to convince the state to
revoke the grant itself. If she failed in that endeavor, she could
file suit not only against the grantee but also against the state,
alleging that it had failed in its public trust responsibilities. Or,
she could seek to join the state as an additional plaintiff.
Whatever the procedural approach, the reason for bringing the
state into the lawsuit would again be to assure compensation for
the improvements erected by the grantee.
Under either approach to equitable compensation, the state
would likely fit the description of a necessary party under Rule
199. See, e.g., Somerville v. Jacobs, 170 S.E.2d 805, 813 (W. Va. 1969) (requiring
landowner to pay compensation "even though free from any inequitable conduct in
connection with the construction of the building upon his land"); Topham v. Hodges,
221 S.W.2d 27 (Ark. 1949) (requiring true owner to pay compensation to mistaken
improver even though state had mistakenly sold the property in two separate tax
sales); Peck v. M.C. Developers, Inc., 618 A.2d 940 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992)
(allowing mistaken improver to remove house built on wrong lot without true owner's
knowledge). More often, however, one of the factors courts emphasize in decisions
requiring the true owner to pay compensation is the owner's failure to take action
despite an awareness that another is mistakenly erecting improvements on the
property. See, e.g., Howard C. Joyce, Annotation, Estoppel by Apparent Acquiescence
in or Silence Concerning Improvements of Real Property to Assert Antagonistic Title
or Interest, 76 A.L.R. 304 (1932) (citing multitude of cases); Dickinson, supra note 57,
at 40 & n.20.
200. As a matter of property law, there does not seem to be any impediment to
allowing a person other than the state to pay compensation. Unlike a covenant, a
condition is simply a statement of fact. See, e.g., Amy B. Cohen, "Arising Under"
Jurisdiction and the Copyright Laws, 44 HASTINGs L.J. 337, 392 (1993) (describing
this distinction). Termination cannot occur until compensation is made.
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19(a) of the Federal" ' Rules of Civil Procedure.2"2 Because the
state is a necessary party, Rule 19(a) requires that it be joined, if
possible.20 3 Ordering joinder of the state, however, may present
problems because of sovereign immunity. As discussed above,
absent state waiver of sovereign immunity, a court may not
award compensation against the state.20 4 Although state consent
to a recoupment counterclaim can be inferred from a state's
decision to file suit, 20 5 in this situation the state would not itself
have filed suit. Accordingly, the state may retain its immunity
and the court would lack jurisdiction over it.2" 6 If a court could
201. Even though the public trust doctrine is a state common-law doctrine,
reference to FED. R. CIV. P. 19 is appropriate because it and the rest of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure have been adopted in large part in most of the states. See
generally John B. Oakley & Arthur F. Coon, The Federal Rules in State Courts: A
Survey of State Court Systems of Civil Procedure, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1367 (1986).
Thus, in the discussion in the text and notes above and below, reference is made to
the federal rules and federal cases interpreting the federal rules.
202. Under Rule 19(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party is
considered necessary to the action if:
(1) in the person's absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those
already parties, or (2) the person claims an interest relating to the subject
of the action and is so situated that the disposition of the action in the
person's absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede the person's
ability to protect that interest or (ii) leave any of the persons already parties
subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligations by reason of the claimed interest.
FED. R. CIv. P. 19(a). In the hypothetical case described, the state is a necessary
party because without it complete relief cannot be accorded the grantee defendant.
203. Presumably, the grantee of trust resources could bring a third-party claim
against the state, or seek to join the state as a party, and if the state successfully
avoided the court's jurisdiction, the grantee would then move to dismiss the case for
plaintiff's failure to join an indispensable party. Alternatively, the grantee could
forego suing the state and simply move to dismiss on the ground that the private
plaintiff failed to join an indispensable party by failing to sue the state or join it as
a plaintiff.
204. See supra Part I.D.
205. See supra notes 171-74 and accompanying text.
206. The plaintiff could perhaps circumvent the state's sovereign immunity by
styling the action as one against a state official, to require the official to revoke a
grant of trust resources. Although the revocation would trigger a compensation
obligation, the plaintiff could argue that payment of compensation is merely
incidental to the official's responsibility to carry out her duties and thus falls within
a state law immunity exception analogous to the Eleventh Amendment exception
articulated in Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). On the other hand, because the
compensation is not truly prospective relief but payment for a past abuse of trust
responsibilities, it seems more likely that the state, absent consent, would in fact be
immune from a compensation obligation. Cf. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974)
(holding that federal court suits against a state for retrospective monetary relief are
not allowed).
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not order the state's joinder, it would need to address whether the
state was an indispensable party without whom the suit could not
go forward.2"7 Rule 19(b) sets forth the factors to consider:
[F]irst, to what extent a judgment rendered in the person's
absence might be prejudicial to the person or those already
parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions.
in the judgment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures,
the prejudice can be lessened or avoided; third, whether a
judgment rendered in the person's absence will be adequate;
fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if
the action is dismissed for nonjoinder. 20 8
Applying these factors, it is not at all clear that a public trust
lawsuit should proceed in the absence of the state. 29 The grantee
could persuasively argue for dismissal because any judgment
rendered against her in the absence of the state would likely be
inadequate and prejudicial to her entitlement to equitable
compensation, unless the court could shape its relief to require
207. Of course, to the extent the state is not immune from suit, a court will not
need to address the indispensability question. As discussed infra Part II.B, a state
could remove any jurisdictional obstacles by passing legislation making the state
amenable to suit for compensation for improvements.
208. FED. R. Civ. P. 19(b). The application of each of these four factors involves
considerable discretion and none of the four factors is intended to be dispositive. The
four factors are intended only to guide the court in its broader determination of
"whether in equity and good conscience the action should proceed among the parties
before it, or should be dismissed." Id. See Kickapoo Tribe of Indians v. Babbitt, 43
F.3d 1491 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("The rule calls for a pragmatic decision based on practical
considerations in the context of particular litigation.") (citing Provident Tradesman
Bank & Trust Co. v. Patterson, 390 U.S. 102, 116-17 n.12, 118 (1968) and WRIGHT,
ET. AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D § 1601, at 10, 14 (1986)).
209. Courts commonly dismiss lawsuits where a sovereign is a necessary party
but not available because of its sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Kescoli v. Babbitt, 101
F.3d 1304, 1310-12 (9th Cir. 1996) (dismissing suit because Indian tribes were
necessary and indispensable parties but immune from suit); United States ex rel.
Hall v. Tribal Dev. Corp., 100 F.3d 476, 478 (7th Cir. 1996) (same); Kickapoo Tribe
v. Babbitt, 43 F.3d 1491, 1496-99 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (dismissing suit where Kansas was
a necessary and indispensable party but immune from suit); Enterprise Management
Consultants, Inc. v. United States, 883 F.2d 890, 893-94 (10th Cir. 1989) (dismissing
case when a tribe could not be joined to a suit on account of sovereign immunity);
Texas v. New Mexico, 352 U.S. 991 (1957) (dismissing because of inability to join
United States); Arizona v. California, 298 U.S. 558 (1936) (same); cf. Cherokee
Nation v. Babbitt, 117 F.3d 1489 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (reversing the district court's Rule
19(b) dismissal because although the Delaware tribe was a necessary and
indispensable party to a lawsuit the tribe lacked sovereign immunity). But see Idaho
ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 444 U.S. 380 (1980) (allowing suit to proceed despite
inability to join United States).
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the citizen plaintiff to pay the compensation. On the other hand,
the citizen plaintiff could argue against dismissal for non-joinder
on the grounds that she would lack any remedy if the public trust
action were not allowed to proceed.21° This argument against
dismissal is not, however, as convincing. Where the state has
decided not to join in the litigation, the safest assumption is that
the public (by way of its representatives) has affirmed its current
resource allocation and determined that revocation or alteration
is inappropriate, or at least should wait for another day.
Because the state is best viewed as an indispensable party,
if it is immune from joinder, by whatever procedural mechanism,
a private plaintiff's public trust claim should be dismissed unless
she is willing to pay the grantee's compensation herself. Plainly,
this conclusion upsets, albeit indirectly, the accepted notion that
private plaintiffs have standing to bring public trust claims. Yet
the notion of individual public trust suits has never sat easily
alongside the principle that grants of trust resources are not void
but merely voidable. Surely the right to void a grant of trust
resources, to the extent it exists at all, resides in the state, as
representative of the public, and not in any member of the public
who may differ on the appropriate time for revocation.21' It is
only if grants are void ab initio that it makes sense that any
210. An analogous case on which a public trust plaintiff might try to rely is
Narragansett Tribe v. Southern Rhode Island Land Development Corp., 418 F. Supp.
798 (D.R.I. 1976). There, the plaintiff Indian tribe filed suit against Rhode Island
and various individuals and businesses seeking to establish its right to possession
of certain lands which it claimed had been acquired by the defendants in violation
of the Indian Non-Intercourse Act. See id. at 809. The defendants sought to join the
United States as a plaintiff under FED. R. CIv. P. 19(a) because they were concerned
that a judgment in their favor would not be binding on the United States in a later
proceeding (the United States clearly had the right to bring an action under the Non-
Intercourse Act as trustee for the tribe). See id. at 810. The court found that the
United States was a "necessary" party within the meaning of Rule 19 but that the
court was without jurisdiction because of the United States' immunity. See id. The
court, however, concluded that the United States was not indispensable and that the
suit could proceed because a contrary decision would "effectively prevent plaintiff
from ever bringing its case without the voluntary assistance of the United States."
Id. at 811-12. Narragansett and the standard public trust case are, however,
distinguishable in that, the public trust plaintiff is only one of many beneficiaries
represented by the state whereas the tribe was the sole beneficiary of the United
States' trust responsibility. See also Kickapoo Tribe, 43 F.3d at 1499 ("[A]bsence of
an alternative remedy alone does not dictate retention of jurisdiction under Rule
19.").
211. Although a citizen could bring a mandamus action against the state to
require it to revoke an improvident grant of trust resources, such an action could run
afoul of the state's sovereign immunity. See supra note 206 (discussing this issue).
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member of the public can file suit against a grantee of trust
resources. But again, the conclusion that grants of trust re-
sources were void from their inception is scuppered by the reality
that such grants are many and long-standing.212
Even if the state is not immune from an obligation to pay
compensation, a court would seemingly want to exercise caution
before ordering the state to pay compensation as a result of a
private plaintiff's public trust action.213 Unless the state is joined
and then supports the plaintiff's position, a court could end up
revoking or altering a grant and requiring the state to pay
compensation even though the state actually supports the
grantee's current use of the trust resource, or at least acquiesces
in it. Of course, a court wedded to the anti-majoritarian task of
rejecting the conveyancing decision of a prior legislature is not
likely to be detained by concern about requiring a current
majority to pay compensation without its consent. But the court
should be. That concern should not, however, lead a court to go
ahead and revoke a grant of trust resources while declining to
order compensation. Ordering an unconsenting state to pay
compensation to the grantee is the lesser of two evils, given that
the state will likely benefit from the court's public trust decision.
In the end, if the state is not a willing participant in a public trust
claim, the better conclusion is that an individual citizen does not
have a right to seek revocation of a prior grant of trust
resources.
21 4
212. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
213. As discussed below, a state could, of course, signal its desire to pay
compensation in such instances by passing legislation making clear that the state
will pay compensation even if it is not a party to a decision invalidating or restricting
a grant based on the public trust doctrine. See infra Part II.B.
214. It is important to recognize that this analysis of the compensation question
continues to operate on the premise that a trust resource can be taken from a grantee
without implicating the Fourteenth Amendment. If exercise of the public trust
doctrine does implicate the Constitution, then judicial revocation of a trust resource
upon motion of a private plaintiff would constitute the clearest form of judicial
taking. Although he questions whether a court has such power to take property, in
his seminal article on judicial takings Professor Thompson suggests that a court does
have authority to award compensation in such instances. See Barton H. Thompson,
Jr., Judicial Takings, 76 VA. L. REV. 1449, 1515-16 (1990). He observes, however,
that if the court is concerned about its power or practical ability to order the
legislature to automatically pay compensation as a result of the court's decision to
take property, the court could instead condition its public trust ruling on the
legislature's being willing to provide compensation within some set period of time.
See id. at 1520-21. If the legislature appropriates compensation, the ruling stands,
but otherwise the grantee would continue to control the trust resource. Applying this
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3. The Forgotten Equitable Compensation Principle
The procedural complications introduced by equitable
compensation should not obscure the basic point that equitable
compensation should be a part of public trust litigation. If a court
concludes that grants of trust resources are void ab initio, it can,
and should, award compensation to a grantee as part of an
equitable defense or counterclaim. And if a court makes the more
palatable and defensible conclusion that grants of trust resources
are merely voidable, compensation should be an element of a
public trust claim, a constructive condition of termination.
Unfortunately, despite these different conceptual justifications for
awarding equitable compensation, there is sparse mention of
equitable compensation in the case law.
In three cases the California Supreme Court has cited Illinois
Central for the proposition that the state owes a grantee compen-
sation for improvements, but the court also relied on a California
statute 215 mandating compensation for improvements where the
"legislative choice" approach to the issue of equitable compensation rather than
Fourteenth Amendment compensation may have merit. It would eliminate both the
sovereign immunity concern and the fear that the state would be ordered to pay
compensation where it actually supports the current resource allocation. In essence,
the court would be allowing the legislature its opportunity to revoke a prior grant of
trust resources upon payment of compensation. If the court is to leave the decision
up to the legislature, however, it would perhaps make more sense to simply require
that the state bring the claim in the first instance.
215. Section 6312 of the California Public Resources Code provides, in relevant
part:
Neither the state, nor any political subdivision thereof, shall take
possession of lawful improvements on validly granted or patented
tidelands or submerged lands without the tender of a fair and just
compensation for such lawful improvements as may have been made in
good faith by the grantee or patentee or his successors in interest
pursuant to any express or implied license contained in the grant or
patent.
Nothing herein contained shall be deemed to prevent the parties to
a grant or patent of tidelands from agreeing, as a part of such grant or
patent, that there shall be no compensation paid for any improvement
made on those tidelands to which such agreement relates.
Nothing herein contained is intended to increase, diminish, or affect
the title of any person in any validly granted or patented tidelands or
submerged lands.
This section shall not be construed to require compensation for any
change in the use of tidelands or submerged lands as a result of
governmental regulation that prohibits, restricts, delays, or otherwise
affects the construction of any planned or contemplated improvement.
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 6312 (West 1996).
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state resumes possession of land under navigable water. 1
Moreover, in each case compensation for improvements was not
directly at issue. 17 Thus, the cases do not necessarily evidence a
conviction that compensation is warranted by way of recoupment
or as a condition of revocation. They could just as easily be read
as offering dicta that compensation is only available where the
state has passed legislation agreeing to pay. Beyond California,
the case law is barren of the suggestion that equitable compensa-
tion should be paid where the public trust doctrine is the vehicle
216. In State v. Superior Court (Fogerty), 625 P.2d 256 (Cal. 1981), a case
involving application of the public trust doctrine to lands between high and low
water mark in Lake Tahoe, the court stated:
Landowners who have previously constructed docks, piers and other
structures in the shorezone may continue to use these facilities unless the
state determines, in accordance with applicable law, that their continued
existence is inconsistent with the reasonable needs of the trust. In that
event, both statute and case law require that plaintiffs be compensated
for the improvements they have constructed in the shorezone.
Id. at 261 (citations omitted); see also City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d
362, 373 (Cal. 1980) ("[Any improvements made on [tidelands or submerged lands]
could not be appropriated by the state without compensation."); id. at 374 ("We
appreciate also that there may be some improvements upon tidelands areas, such as
docks, in which a landowner's reliance interest should be recognized to some
degree."). In National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983)
(Mono Lake), the court only mentioned the compensation issue in a footnote and
merely cited Fogerty and Berkeley. See id. at 723 n.22. It did not expressly rely on
§ 6312 of the California Public Resources Code. To the extent it intended to rely on
the statute, that reliance seemingly would have been misplaced because the statute's
language covers only grants of tidelands and submerged lands and not water rights.
See supra note 215 (quoting statute).
217. In Berkeley, the compensation question had not yet arisen because the
court had only decided which lands were subject to the public trust. The court only
offered that "there may be some improvements upon tideland areas, such as docks,
in which a landowner's reliance interest should be recognized to some degree." 606
P.2d at 374 (emphasis added). In Fogerty, the court likewise merely held that the
land at issue was impressed with the public trust and did not divest or restrict the
landowners' use of any improvements. See 625 P.2d at 261. In Mono Lake the court
was reviewing a summary judgment on the question of whether the public trust
doctrine applied to water rights and the court's reference to compensation appears
to be nothing more than a footnote filling out the court's description of its earlier
decision in Berkeley. See 658 P.2d at 723. The only sense in which the California
Supreme Court has applied equitable compensation principles was by its holding in
Berkeley that where tidelands had been filled or improved to the point where they
were no longer "physically adaptable" to trust uses, they became free of the trust.
See 606 P.2d at 363, 373. In a sense, deciding that the grantee could have fee title
in such situations is like an award of equitable compensation. The court simply
decided that the state's right to revoke should be offset completely by equity. See
infra notes 235-37 and accompanying text (discussing this issue). Unfortunately,
there is no evidence that the court self-consciously based this part of its ruling on the
compensation obligation of Illinois Central or the California Public Resources Code.
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by which a grantee's use of a trust resource is diminished or
eliminated.
There are a variety of reasons why courts have paid such
little attention to the equitable compensation principle. In some
cases, compensation has not been an issue because no improve-
ments have been erected in reliance upon the grant.21 In other
cases, improvements exist but the state has not sought to take
them, perhaps because the improvements are built in reliance on
riparian rights rather than the public trust conveyance, 219 or
perhaps because wharves, docks, and other such improvements
are often permissible under Illinois Central because they fulfill a
trust objective: furthering waterborne commerce.22 ° Still another
reason compensation has not been an issue is that courts may
have viewed the principle as limited to compensation for actual
physical improvements and as not including compensation for
expenditures made in reliance upon the grant of trust resources
which are also recoverable in equity.221
A final reason for the lack of equitable compensation cases is
that actual judicial application of the public trust doctrine,
218. See, e.g., State v. Superior Court (Lyon), 625 P.2d 239 (Cal. 1981) (finding
no development at time of public trust dispute); CWC Fisheries, Inc. v. Bunker, 755
P.2d 1115 (Alaska 1988) (holding public trust doctrine prohibits owner from
excluding fisherman from unimproved tidelands); Kootenai Envtl. Alliance, Inc. v.
Panhandle Yacht Club, 671 P.2d 1085, 1094 (Idaho 1983) (holding that a lease for the
construction of private docking facilities on Lake Coeur d'Alene did not violate the
public trust doctrine but may at a future date; not addressing whether compensation
would be due if the doctrine were later invoked); Caminiti v. Boyle, 732 P.2d 989
(Wash. 1987) (deciding the constitutionality of a state statute allowing owners of
residential property to install private recreational docks).
219. See, e.g., Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 445-48 (recognizing the Railroad's
right in the wharves it built pursuant to its riparian rights); supra note 51
(discussing this aspect of Illinois Central).
220. See Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 452 ("It is grants of parcels of lands under
navigable waters that may afford foundation for wharves, piers, docks and other
structures in aid of commerce ... that are chiefly considered and sustained in the
adjudged cases as a valid exercise of legislative power consistently with the trust
..... ); see also People v. California Fish Co., 138 P. 79, 82, 94 (Cal. 1913) (noting that
parties withdrew by stipulation any issue as to compensation for various
improvements erected in reliance upon the grants at issue). Courts have also
avoided the compensation question by suggesting that the grantee may continue to
use existing docks and wharves because they fulfill the original marine commerce
purposes of the grant but that any other use of the property is disallowed. See, e.g.,
State v. Central Vt. Ry., Inc., 571 A.2d 1128 (Vt. 1989).
221. See infra notes 224, 254 and accompanying text (noting additional
expenditures, including property taxes and purchase price, for which courts and
legislatures have awarded equitable compensation).
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particularly in the context of appropriative water rights, has been
more limited than the vast academic commentary might
suggest.222 And it is in the application of the public trust doctrine
to water rights that the idea of equitable compensation has some
of its greatest merit. Although a state may often assert its public
trust interest in tidelands without requiring the removal of
wharves and docks, when it asserts its public trust interest in
water so as to eliminate or diminish an appropriative right, a
variety of improvements (conveyance systems, crops, treatment
plants, pumping stations, and the like) could be affected. Thus,
to some extent, this discussion about equitable compensation, like
so many others about the public trust doctrine, is a discussion
about the doctrine's potential uses and abuses. In any event,
whether as a corrective to flaws in the current application of the
public trust doctrine, or as a means of avoiding unjust expansion
of the doctrine in the future, grantees should request and courts
should award equitable compensation.22
4. The Components of an Equitable Compensation
Award
With regard to the nature of equitable compensation courts
should award, it is not the goal of this article to detail the
222. Professor Weber states this point with particular eloquence. Arguing that
the public trust doctrine is largely existential with respect to revocations of
appropriative water rights, he states:
We know the doctrine exists and might compel potentially massive water
reallocations. Absent the doctrine's application by a court of law to a
concrete situation, however, we simply know almost nothing about when
these reallocations can occur. The doctrine's potential judicial articulation
remains almost fully inchoate. In this virtually unbridled potential lies
much of the doctrine's mystique and some of its power.
Weber, supra note 186, at 1235.
223. One argument sure to be made against awarding equitable compensation
for improvements is that doing so would create an incentive for persons to spend on
improvements to the detriment of the environment. See Sprankling, supra note 64
(making this argument about the impacts of laws awarding compensation to
mistaken improvers). It could also be said that imposing a compensation obligation
on the state will make the state less likely to revoke grants of trust resources,
allowing further harm to the environment. It is hard to dispute either argument but
neither one is a persuasive reason for treating the grantee unjustly. The real
question is whether the public or one citizen should pay the price for improvident
historical resource allocations. Compensation for improvements is a small price to
pay for a state obtaining the large, otherwise cost-free benefits of the public trust
doctrine.
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particular improvements and expenditures for which compensa-
tion is appropriate. In mistaken improver cases, courts have
compensated for a wide variety of improvements,224 have adopted
different valuation methods,225 and have adopted different forms
of remedial relief.226 This variety is not surprising because the
very nature of equity dictates that the type and amount of
compensation will vary depending on the particular equitable
circumstances before a court.227 Thus, if compensation in public
trust cases arises as a separate equitable defense or counterclaim,
it would be inappropriate to select one definitive equitable
compensation remedy. On the other hand, if compensation is a
permanent fixture of the public trust doctrine, as the more
persuasive interpretation would suggest, some sort of consistent
definition of equitable compensation is more desirable. Both the
grantee and the state would benefit from knowing the value of the
224. Among the improvements for which courts have granted compensation are:
buildings; substantial additions to buildings; fences; crops; trees and shrubbery;
widening and improving of streets by grading, paving, resurfacing, and constructing
curbs, gutters, and storm sewers; the clearing and draining of land; the preparation
of land for building sites or for planting of crops; wells affording a permanent water
supply; lasting systems of drains and ditches for irrigation and carrying off surface
water; and mines and oil wells. See J.E. Macy, Annotation, Measure and Items of
Recovery for Improvements Mistakenly Placed or Made on Land of Another, 24 A.L.R.
2D 11, §§ 3-14 (1952). Property taxes are another expenditure that fits in the
category of improvements. See Notelzah, Inc. v. Destival, 537 N.W.2d 687, 692 (Iowa
1995) (awarding "property taxes paid in the good-faith belief it was the owner");
Macaulay v. Howard, 94 S.E.2d 393, 396-97 (S.C. 1956) (same); Rise v. Steckel, 652
P,2d 364, 372 (Or. Ct. App. 1982) (allowing the mistaken improver to set-off taxes
paid against the owner's claim for rents and profits); Miceli v. Riley, 436 N.Y.S.2d 72,
75 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981) (same); Haight v. Pine, 42 N.Y.S. 303, 305 (N.Y. App. Div.
1896) (same). See generally Dickinson, supra note 57, at 49 n.59 (noting that because
taxes paid by the mistaken improver release the owners of tax liability, the mistaken
improver is entitled to relief under modern restitutionary principles) (citing
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 43(1), 54(1) (1937)); Andrew Kull, Rationalizing
Restitution, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1202 (1995) ("One who mistakenly pays taxes
assessed on a neighboring tract has a claim in restitution against the neighbor ... ").
225. See Dickinson, supra note 57, at 62-64 (discussing different valuation
methods employed by courts and state legislatures).
226. See id. at 64-68 (describing the various types of remedies employed by
courts, including: giving the mistaken improver a lien on the property, allowing the
true owner to elect to pay the improver or sell the land to the improver for its fair
market value in an unimproved state, allowing the improver to remove the
improvements, and ordering a cotenancy); Merryman, supra note 58, at 467-68
(discussing different forms of relief).
227. See Dickinson, supra note 57, at 64 ('The search for an appropriate
remedy, one that will do substantial justice to the owner and provide the improver
with a measure of restitution, has been a difficult one. There are several methods
for accomplishing restitution, although none is perfect for all cases.").
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constructive condition placed on the state's constructive power of
termination. The state could weigh in advance the cost of
revoking a grant and the grantee could better calibrate the risks
and benefits associated with investment in and use of a trust
resource.
Unfortunately, the very nature of a constructive condition
makes it unamenable to consistent application, just as the public
trust doctrine itself has been so inconsistent in its application and
expansion."' This insusceptibility argues in favor of a legislative
resolution, the possibility of which is discussed below.229 To the
extent courts are to give further definition to the constructive
condition of equitable compensation, beyond the basic injunction
that the state should pay the grantee for improvements built in
reliance upon the grant of trust resources,23 ° fairness suggests two
refinements. First, courts should determine the amount of
compensation with reference to the cost of the improvements
rather than the enhanced value of the property, as is more often
done in mistaken improver cases.231 Although paying for
enhanced value makes sense if the only equitable goal of compen-
sation were avoiding unjust enrichment, it is inappropriate in a
public trust case where the concern is avoiding injustice to the
grantee.232 Moreover, in a public trust case, the state typically
228. See Blumm, supra note 9, at 579 (describing the public trust doctrine as
"chameleon-like").
229. See infra Part II.B.
230. See Illinois v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 U.S. 387, 455 (1892)
("Undoubtedly there may be expenses incurred in improvements made under such
a grant which the State ought to pay ... ").
231. See Dickinson, supra note 57, at 62 (noting that the typical compensation
formula in betterment acts is to compensate the mistaken improver for the value of
the improvement, "that is, of the difference in the fair market value of the land with
and without the improvement"); see also Uhlhorn v. Keltner, 723 S.W.2d 131, 137
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1986) ('The amount that can be recovered as compensation for
improvements is the amount by which the improvements enhance the value of the
land. This is not the same as the actual cost of the improvements."); Green v.
Bambrick, 49 N.W.2d 160, 163 (Mich. 1951) (same).
232. Avoiding unjust enrichment is only one of the equitable factors to consider
in deciding on the appropriate form and amount of equitable compensation. The
court must also consider the equities of the mistaken improver. See Dickinson, supra
note 57, at 74 (suggesting that in developing a remedy, "the starting point must be
an assessment of the equities of both parties"). Thus, even though mistaken
improvers most often recover only the increased value of the land and not the actual
costs of their improvements, see supra note 231, that is not always the case. See
Dickinson, supra note 57, at 68 (observing that where "a property owner deliberately
misleads the improver or acquiesces in the improver's mistake" the improver is
entitled to relief regardless of increase in market value); id. at 61, 69-70; see also
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desires to resume control over a trust resource so that it can
return it to a more "natural" condition. In such situations,
existing improvements generally do not enrich the state, and may
in fact be to its detriment. Thus, if equity is to be accomplished,
payment should be based on expenditure rather than on in-
creased property value.233 Of course, equitable compensation for
expenditures should in no case exceed the just compensation that
would have been payable had the state simply exercised its
eminent domain power.234
Second, as suggested in the Illinois Central litigation, where
the trust property has been so altered that it is no longer useful
for trust purposes, the trust will not apply to the property and fee
simple title will vest in the grantee.23 5 Other courts have taken
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 53(3) (1937) (suggesting compensation for
"appropriate improvements" without respect to the increased value of the land where
the land was acquired from the owner only to see the grant later avoided by the
owner because of a mistake of law); id. at § 42(3); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§ 292(1) cmt. d (1959) (stating that if the trustee in breach of trust transfers trust
property and no value is paid for the transfer, the gratuitous transferee who makes
improvements without notice "can be compelled to surrender the property only if he
is reimbursed for such expenditures, even though the property is not benefitted to
the extent of the amount expended"). By not tying compensation to the increased
market value of the trust resource, a court would also avoid the difficult valuation
questions raised by comparing the value of improvements to the recreational or
ecological value of a trust resource.
233. The amount of compensation also should not be offset by the benefit
afforded the grantee during the time she used the trust resource. Although this is
a remedy that has been employed in some mistaken improver cases, see, e.g., Roesch
v. Wachter, 618 P.2d 448, 451 (Or. Ct. App. 1980), it is not appropriate in the public
trust context. In many instances, a public trust grantee will already have paid the
state for the benefit of using the trust resource, albeit typically a small amount.
Thus, to diminish a grantee's equitable compensation by the benefit received would
only double the inequity of revocation. If grants of trust resources are revocable, the
implicit contract is that the grantee will benefit from the trust resource until such
time as the state chooses to revoke the grant, in which case the state will pay for
improvements. Finally, it is worth noting that Arizona has addressed this question
by statute, providing that the state will not claim compensation from a grantee "for
any good faith use of public trust lands" where certain conditions are met. See ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-1155 (West 1993).
234. See infra note 258 and accompanying text (discussing this issue in the
context of an Arizona statute providing for compensation where a state revokes a
prior grant of a navigable streambed).
235. See Illinois v. Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 33 F. 730, 775-76 (N.D. Ill. 1888)
(recognizing the Railroad's title to the portion of the submerged lands which it had
already filled). Basic principles of equity support such an outcome. See gener-
ally RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 69(1) (1937) ("The right of a person to
restitution from another because of a benefit received is terminated or diminished
if, after the receipt of the benefit, circumstances have so changed that it would be
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this approach, holding that where "the tidelands ha[d] been
rendered substantially valueless" for trust uses, those tidelands
were no longer subject to the trust.236 Although there is some
concern that such a general rule would create an incentive to fill,
drain, and otherwise severely alter trust lands, in truth, the
principle would largely apply to areas long ago altered. The
potential for current activities irrevocably altering trust lands
should be adequately controlled by state and federal environmen-
tal regulations. 237 And in the case of lands long ago altered in
reliance upon a grant of trust resources, the most equitable
solution is simply to recognize the fee title truly intended by the
original grant, particularly if the lands are in fact no longer
useful for trust purposes.
B. Legislation Requiring Compensation for Improvements
Unfortunately, waiting on the courts may not insure that
equitable compensation is a condition of revoking or limiting a
prior grant of trust resources. Not only might courts fail to
inequitable to require the other to make full restitution."); id. at § 178 ("The right to
enforce a constructive trust may be terminated as a result of the defendant's change
of position."); Joyce, supra note 199, at 320-27 (listing a variety of cases supporting
the proposition that a vendor or other person claiming an interest in land may be
estopped if he had knowledge of improvements being made but acquiesced in them).
236. See City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 606 P.2d 362, 373 (Cal. 1980); see
also Opinion of the Justices, 424 N.E.2d 1092, 1099-100 (Mass. 1981) ("[Tlhe
Legislature has authority to surrender any so-called vestigial or residual public
rights in lawfully filled, formerly submerged, land."); Opinion of the Justices, 437
A.2d 597, 607 (Me. 1981) (same); Greater Providence Chamber of Commerce v. State,
657 A.2d 1038, 1044 (R.I. 1995) (same); City of Long Beach v. Mansell, 476 P.2d 423,
450-51 (Cal. 1970) (estopping state from asserting trust in tidelands long-developed
by homeowners); Atwood v. Hammond, 48 P.2d 20 (Cal. 1935) (allowing state to free
filled tidelands from the public trust). See generally WATERS, supra note 2,
§ 30.02(d)(3) (discussing this issue). In other instances, however, courts have held
that even filled tidelands which are no longer physically adaptable to trust uses
remain subject to the public trust. See, e.g., City of Alameda v. Todd Shipyards
Corp., 632 F. Supp. 333, 341 (N.D. Cal. 1986) (citing cases for the proposition that
"filling alone does not terminate the trust"); Hayes v. A. J. Assocs., Inc., 846 P.2d 131,
133 (Alaska 1993) (same). For a state statute that establishes a procedure for
determining when land under navigable water should be released from its public
trust status, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-1151 (West 1996) (enumerating a variety
of factors for determining if the property "is no longer of material use for protecting
public trust values").
237. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (1994) (setting forth permit
requirements for the discharge of dredged or fill material); Forest Properties, Inc. v.
United States, No. 92-851L, 1997 U.S. Claims LEXIS 163 (Fed. Cl. Aug. 6, 1997)
(denying a permit to fill certain submerged lands of Big Bear Lake).
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recognize the principle, but also, even if recognized, the proce-
dural and immunity questions raised by the compensation issue...
might make courts reluctant to act. The best way to avoid such
concerns is for states simply to enact legislation providing for
equitable compensation whenever the state resumes possession
or control of a public trust resource.
A couple of states have taken steps in that direction.
California, as mentioned above,239 has a statute providing that
whenever the State resumes possession of tidelands or submerged
lands, it must pay compensation "for such lawful improvements
as may have been made in good faith by the grantee or patentee
or his successors in interest pursuant to any express or implied
license contained in the grant or patent."24 The statute, however,
is inadequate because it is limited to complete repossession of
tidelands and submerged lands. Thus, it fails to provide compen-
sation in those instances where the public trust doctrine has been
expanded beyond its traditional bounds to appropriative water
rights, as it has in California.241 The statute also includes a
needless "good faith" requirement. Although the requirement is
softened by recognition that the grantee's right to improve could
have been either "express or implied," the good faith inquiry is
not helpful. As explained above,242 not only does the inquiry
entangle the decision-maker in the embarrassing conundrum of
how the public trust easement could be long-standing and yet
unknown to the grantee, but also it is inconsistent with the
proposition that grants are not void ab initio.243 Thus, absent an
agreement between the state and a grantee that no compensation
238. See supra Part II.A.2. (discussing these procedural and jurisdictional
issues).
239. See supra notes 215-16 and accompanying text.
240. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 6312 (West 1977); see also supra note 215 (quoting
statutory language in full).
241. See National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983)
(Mono Lake) (extending the public trust doctrine to appropriative water rights); see
also United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n,
247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976) (holding that the public trust doctrine requires the state
to engage in water planning).
242. See supra Part II.A.1.
243. See supra notes 192-93 and accompanying text.
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is necessary, 244 any grant of trust resources should require
compensation as a condition of revocation.
California's equitable impulse to compensate grantees
affected by exercise of the public trust doctrine is also reflected in
special legislation it passed to help settle the Mono Lake litiga-
tion, which had resulted in substantial limits to Los Angeles'
diversions from the tributaries feeding Mono Lake.245 To offset
the impact of the public trust taking, the State appropriated $36
million to contribute to a $55 million waste-water re-infiltration
project 246 of the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power.247
244. Cf. CAL. HARB. & NAV. CODE App. II § 78 (West 1978) (granting certain
tidelands and submerged lands to the Humboldt Bay Harbor, Recreation, and
Conservation District subject to a variety of conditions, including the state's right to
retake the lands for purposes of a highway without paying compensation except for
improvements erected thereon); Board of Port Comm'rs of Oakland v. Williams, 70
P.2d 918 (Cal. 1937) (interpreting Tideland Act of 1911, 1911 Calif. Stat. ch. 654,
which provided for 25 year leases of tidelands terminable at will by the City of
Oakland but, in certain instances, required payment of compensation for
improvements).
245. Although the California Supreme Court handed down its Mono Lake
decision in 1983, 658 P.2d 709 (Cal. 1983), it was not until 1989 that an injunction
was entered preventing Los Angeles from diverting water. See generally Blumm &
Schwartz, supra note 9, at 715-16 (discussing the aftermath of the Mono Lake
litigation). And it was 1994 before the state water board amended Los Angeles'
water rights to establish a permanent plan for raising the level of Mono Lake. See
id.; Cynthia L. Koehler, Water Rights and the Public Trust Doctrine: Resolution of the
Mono Lake Controversy, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 541, 571-76 (1995) (same). The state water
board estimated that the annual costs of replacement water and lost hydropower
would be $36.3 million over the next twenty years and $23.5 million per year after
the lake reached the designated level. See Blumm & Schwartz, supra note 9, at 719-
20 (citing Decision and Order Amending Water Right Licenses to Establish Fishery
Protection Flows in Streams Tributary to Mono Lake and to Protect Public Trust
Resources at Mono Lake and in the Mono Lake Basin, Decision 1631, Cal. State
Water Resources Control Board, Sept. 28, 1994, at 180); Koehler, supra at 574-76
(discussing same cost figures).
246. The reinfiltration project is designed to "provide 35,000 acre-feet a year of
highly treated wastewater to recharge a natural underground reservoir in the north
San Fernando Valley." San Fernando Valley Briefly: City Receives Grant for Water
Recycling, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Feb. 25, 1995, at N3; see also Tim May, Van Nuys Water
Project Gets Initial Federal Funds, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1995, at 2 (describing
project).
247. See CAL. WATER CODE § 12929.14 (West 1994) (appropriating money);
Environmental Water Act of 1989, CAL. WATER CODE § 12929.20 (West 1989)
(initially authorizing appropriation); see also San Fernando Valley Briefly: Water
Conservation Money Received, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Aug. 29, 1995, at N3; May, supra
note 246; San Fernando Valley Briefly: City Receives Grant for Water Recycling,
supra note 246, at N3; Pamela J. Podger & Mark Grossi, Board Votes to Protect a
Dying Mono Lake from L.A. Water Districts Watch to See If Decision Sets a Precedent
for Erosion of Other Water Rights, THE FRESNO BEE, Sept. 29, 1994, at Al (describing
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And the Bureau of Reclamation agreed to contribute another
$12.8 million. 248 Although it is hard to quibble with this compen-
sation outcome, particularly given its conservationist objectives,
such an ad hoc and post hoc approach to compensation remains
unsatisfactory. Whether the state compensates should not
depend on the political clout of the grantee or the visibility of the
public trust taking. Instead, both the state and the grantee
should be able to estimate ex ante the costs of state assertion of
its public trust easement. That will only occur if the payment of
compensation is a condition of termination.
Another approach to equitable compensation is that adopted
by Arizona. In 1987 Arizona enacted a statute quitclaiming to the
record title owners any interest of the State "based on navigabil-
ity" in the beds of all rivers in Arizona save four.249 The statute
was challenged and struck down.250 In response, in 1994, Arizona
passed new legislation251 which established a commission to
agreement with Los Angeles for the receipt of state funds); Sandy Harrison, City
Loses Battle Over Mono Lake: L.A. to Pay More for Other Sources, L.A. DAILY NEWS,
Sept. 29, 1994, at N1 (same).
248. See Reclamation Projects Authorization and Adjustment Act of 1992, Pub.
L. No. 102-575, § 1613, 106 Stat. 4600, 4667-68 (codified in scattered sections of 43
U.S.C.) (authorizing expenditures on Los Angeles Area Water Reclamation and
Reuse Project); see also supra note 247 (citing articles discussing payment).
249. See WATERS, supra note 2, § 30.02(d)(3), at 58 (citing and discussing
statute). The statute excluded the Colorado, Gila, Salt, and Verde rivers. See id.
The statute had been enacted to relieve the supposed threat to existing title caused
by various statements by state officials, including then governor, now Interior
Secretary, Bruce Babbitt, that the state was prepared to re-assert its equal footing
title to land under navigable water in Arizona which had previously been conveyed
out of state ownership. See Arizona Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837
P.2d 158, 162 (Ariz. 1991).
250. See Hassell, 837 P.2d at 158. The court concluded that the quitclaim of
public trust lands violated the gift clause of the Arizona Constitution, which
prohibited the State from making any donation to "any individual, association, or
corporation," absent a public purpose and fair consideration. Id. at 169 (citation
omitted). The court opined that the quit-claim of trust property did not clearly
provide for fair consideration because the statute failed "to provide a mechanism for
particularized assessment of (1) the validity of the equal footing claims that it
relinquishes; (2) the continuing value of land subject to such claims for purposes
consistent with the public trust; (3) equitable and reasonable consideration for claims
that may be relinquished without impairing the public trust; and (4) conditions that
may be necessary to any transfer to assure that public trust interests remain
protected." Id. at 173.
251. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-1101 to 37-1156 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997).
Although only portions are reviewed here, the statute is quite detailed in its effort
to respond to the judicial message of Hassel and to the reliance interests of the
owners of land under navigable water. For a more thorough overview of the statute,
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determine the navigability of streams within the state and to
identify any public trust values associated with those navigable
watercourses. 251 In those situations where the state has conveyed
land under navigable watercourses, the state land department
may, with the legislature's authorization, commence a quiet title
action.25 If the "state's ownership of a parcel or portion of a
parcel of property is confirmed in a quiet title action," the statute
requires the state to pay compensation to the grantee as follows:
1. Refund all property taxes ever paid on the property.
2. Compensate the person for all improvements to the
property.
3. Refund the purchase price paid for the property, plus
interest at the legal rate, if the property was purchased from
this state by the person or-any predecessor in title.254
Like California's statute, Arizona's is limited to compensation
for state revocation of conveyances of land under navigable
waters. In the case of Arizona, however, this may simply reflect
the legislature's desire that the public trust doctrine should not
be expanded beyond its traditional base to other natural re-
sources, such as water. To that extent, the statute wisely refrains
see Tracey Dickman Zobenica, The Public Trust Doctrine in Arizona's Streambeds,
38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1053 (1996). Zobenica relates that the statute has not yet been
subject to judicial review although "some groups have openly challenged its
constitutionality." Id. at 1068 (citations omitted).
252. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-1121 to 37-1132 (West 1993 & Supp. 1997).
253. Before the state land department may act, the legislature must enact
legislation authorizing the department to claim the land and bring a quiet title
action. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-1128, 37-1131 (West Supp. 1997). Arizona
has thus addressed the procedural questions of standing, joinder, and immunity by
providing that the decision on whether to revoke a grant of trust resources is for the
state land department with the authorization of the legislature. See id. As discussed
above, to the extent that under the public trust doctrine grants are merely voidable
and not void ab initio, this limitation is appropriate. See supra notes 211-12 and
accompanying text. But see Zobenica, supra note 251, at 1068-71 (arguing that
limiting judicial action to cases authorized by the legislature violates the separation
of powers doctrine).
254. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-1132 (West Supp. 1997). The statute also calls
for the land department, upon the petition of the record title owner, to determine
whether to release particular lands from their public trust status if they are "no
longer of material use for protecting public trust values." Id. § 37-1151. If the
department decides that any portion of the bed of a navigable stream should be
released from the public trust, it is to appraise the land and put it up for sale or
public auction. See id. § 37-1152. In another effort to compensate the grantee, the
amount of the appraised value of "reasonable improvements ... made in good faith"
is credited and applied to the bid of the grantee. Id.
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from offering courts an additional basis on which to expand the
public trust doctrine.255 If the doctrine is applied to additional
natural resources, however, the statutory framework should be
extended to include them. An advantage of the Arizona statute
over the California approach is that it does not inquire into the
good faith of the grantee,256 thus avoiding the difficulties atten-
dant to that effort.257 From the grantee's perspective, of course,
the greatest benefit of the Arizona statute is its generosity. In
fact, the statutory compensation could be greater than the just
compensation that would be due if Arizona simply exercised its
power of eminent domain. To the extent that proved true-which
seems unlikely given that the land department and legislature
would have the incentive to adopt the less costly of the two
alternatives-the compensation provision could run afoul of the
gift clause in the state constitution.5 Barring a violation of the
255. Arizona has not yet extended the public trust doctrine to appropriative
water rights. See Blumm & Schwartz, supra note 9, at 733-34.
256. Although the statute does not inquire into the good faith of the record title
owner for purposes of compensation following a quiet title action, it does require that
the record owner or lessee have made the improvements in good faith before she will
be credited with the cost of those improvements toward her bid on any land subject
to sale or auction because of its release from the trust. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 37-1152 (West 1993). It seems likely, however, that in this particular statutory
provision "good faith" refers to the time at which the improvements were constructed
(before or after the Commission's determination of navigability and before or after
the petition to release the land from its public trust status) rather than the time at
which the land was conveyed to the grantee.
257. See supra notes 242-43 and accompanying text (discussing this problem
with the California statute).
258. The gift clause prohibits the State from making "any donation or grant, by
subsidy or otherwise, to any individual, association, or corporation." ARIZ. CONST.
art. IX, § 7. Presumably, to the extent the state paid more compensation than
obligated to pay by its eminent domain powers, it would constitute an improper
donation. One commentator, however, has asserted that paying the grantee any
compensation at all would violate the gift clause. See Zobenica, supra note 251, at
1077-78. Her position relies on the standard argument that state exercise of its
public trust easement does not implicate the just compensation requirements of the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and thus the payment of any compensation
would amount to a gift. See id.; see also supra note 14 (discussing this argument).
Setting aside the merits of this constitutional argument, its flaw is that it fails to
consider the possibility of equitable compensation. And if equitable compensation
is permissible, if not required, the statute's compensation provision would only
violate the gift clause if the compensation paid was "so inequitable and unreasonable
that it amounts to an abuse of discretion, thus providing a subsidy to the private
entity." Arizona Ctr. for Law in the Pub. Interest v. Hassell, 837 P.2d 158, 169 (Ariz.
1991) (internal quotations and citations omitted). Perhaps, in keeping with Illinois
Central and the preponderance of mistaken improver laws, this line could be drawn
at compensation for improvements and would exclude the property tax refund and
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gift clause, however, the provision is an acceptable exercise of
state power.259
Other than Arizona and California, states have not passed
legislation awarding compensation to grantees harmed as a result
of the state's exercise of the public trust doctrine.26 0 But Arizona
and California's statutes are at least exemplary of approaches
that legislatures could take to implement an equitable compensa-
tion requirement. Again, it is not this article's goal to design
specific legislation. While some legislatures, such as Arizona's,
may seek to be more generous, at a minimum legislation should
follow Illinois Central's recommendation of compensation for
improvements constructed in reliance upon the grant of trust
resources. Any legislation would also do well to address proce-
dural questions with respect to who may bring a public trust
claim.26 1
the purchase price refund. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 37-1132 (West Supp. 1997).
On the other hand, a court would hardly do an injustice if it deferred to the
legislature's understanding of equity and declined to limit compensation short of the
amount of just compensation, itself the most basic definition of equity in cases where
a person loses her property to the state.
259. See supra note 258; see also infra notes 262-65 and accompanying text
(discussing the viability of compensation statutes more generally).
260. At least, a variety of LEXIS searches have revealed no other state statutes.
A number of other states, however, have passed or have had introduced so-called
"takings legislation." See generally Mark W. Cordes, Leapfrogging the Constitution:
The Rise of State Takings Legislation, 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 187, 190 (1997) ("In the past
three years at least seventeen states have enacted some type of takings legislation.
Moreover, proposed takings legislation has been introduced in almost every state,
with legislation still pending in committee in a number of states.'); David A. Thomas,
The Illusory Restraints and Empty Promises of New Property Protection Laws, 28
URB. LAw. 223 (1996) (reviewing private property protection legislation from 14
states). In those states where the takings legislation expands the scope of
compensable takings, see Cordes, supra at 190 & n.16 (listing four states with
statutes and twenty other states where such bills have been introduced), it arguably
could be a source of compensation for a public trust taking, but only if the grantee
enjoys a property right in the trust resource. Thus, application of the takings
legislation simply returns to the base question of whether the grantee ever had a
property right in the trust resource, and under current public trust law, the answer
to that question would be in the negative. The utility of the equitable compensation
principle is that it is not dependent upon the answer to that question. Of course, if
the right to compensation for improvements is itself understood as a property right,
see supra text accompanying notes 184-85, such takings legislation would surely
apply, but would hardly be necessary because the Constitution itself would require
compensation. See Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987)
(just compensation due when any stick in the bundle of property rights is taken).
261. Legislation could, for example, vest in the state the sole right to revoke
grants of trust resources, as Arizona has done. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 37-1128,
37-1131 (West Supp. 1997); see also supra note 253 (discussing this issue).
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Whatever approach a legislature chooses to adopt, it is clear
that it has power to require equitable compensation. Congress
and state legislatures generally can choose to grant greater
protection to private property than the Federal Constitution or a
particular state constitution demands.262 This has been the
impetus behind the takings legislation introduced in recent
congressional sessions,263 and introduced or passed in a number
of states. 4  States can also alter their common law to grant
compensation in situations where it might not otherwise be due,
witness the various betterment and mistaken improver
statutes.265
If there were any question about legislative power to compen-
sate, it is answered by the closely analogous situations where
Congress has legislated to grant compensation when the United
States exercises its navigation servitude, even though the no
compensation rule would otherwise apply. For example, although
Alternatively, it could give state consent to joinder in private plaintiff public trust
litigation. California, for example, has enacted legislation requiring joinder of the
state to any tidelands dispute to which a political subdivision of the state is a party.
See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 6308 (West 1977) (providing, however, that the State will
not be liable for any costs). That statute could be expanded to include all public trust
disputes.
262. See United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 30 n.14 (1984)
("Congress, of course, has the power to authorize compensation greater than the
constitutional minimum.") (citations omitted). For example, because a grazing
permit does not create a property right in the permittee, Congress may terminate the
permit without paying compensation. Cf. United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 491-
94 (1973) (holding that when the United States condemns property, it need not
compensate for the increased value of that property which results from a neighboring
grazing permit because the United States is free to terminate a grazing lease without
compensation). Nevertheless, Congress has decided that where the United States
cancels a rancher's grazing permit, compensation for improvements shall be
provided. See Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1752(g) (1994)
(providing for the permittee to recover compensation for "permanent improvements
placed or constructed by the permittee or lessee on lands covered by such permit or
lease, but not to exceed the fair market value of the terminated portion of the
permittee's or lessee's interest therein"); see also 43 C.F.R. § 2310.3-5 (1997)
(requiring compensation for improvements to holders of record of permits, licenses,
or leases terminated or revoked by a withdrawal of public lands).
263. See, e.g., S. 781, 105th Cong. (1997) (requiring, among other things,
compensation for diminutions in value of 33% or more); S. 605, 104th Cong. (1995)
(same); H.R. 925, 104th Cong. (1995) (providing compensation when certain types of
federal agency action reduced property value by 20% or more). See generally Cordes,
supra note 260, at 189 (discussing federal takings legislation and citing other articles
doing so).
264. See supra note 260 (discussing such takings legislation).
265. See supra notes 65-71 and accompanying text.
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the Supreme Court had ruled that no compensation was due
owners of shellfish beds whose beds were destroyed by the United
States' exercise of its servitude,2 6 Congress passed legislation
assuring compensation in such situations."' Likewise, after the
Supreme Court confirmed that when the United States exercises
its eminent domain over fast lands adjacent to a river, the owner
is not entitled to compensation for any value that derives from
the owner's access to, or use of, the navigable waterway,268
Congress legislatively provided for compensation for value
created by "access to or utilization of such navigable waters." '269
Several other instances exist where Congress has legislatively
consented to pay compensation despite the existence of its
navigation servitude."' Just as Congress can choose, to pay
compensation where it has an underlying servitude, so too can a
state legislature pay compensation where it has an underlying
public trust servitude. In truth, compensation in the public trust
context is even more compelling given that equitable compensa-
tion is best viewed as an integral part of the doctrine. When a
legislature acts, it does so not gratuitously but to fulfill an
obligation.
266. See Lewis Blue Point Oyster Cultivation Co. v. Briggs, 229 U.S. 82 (1913).
267. See 28 U.S.C. § 1497 (1997) ("The United States Court of Federal Claims
shall have jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim for damages to oyster
growers on private or leased lands or bottoms arising from dredging operations or
use of other machinery and equipment in making river and harbor improvements
authorized by Act of Congress.").
268. See United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 124-25 (1967) (no constitutional
right to compensation for port-site value lost as a result of United States' exercise of
its navigation servitude); see also United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S.
222, 225-26 (1956) (no constitutional right to compensation for power site value).
269. See Rivers and Harbors Act of 1970, 33 U.S.C. § 595a (1997).
270. See WATERS, supra note 2, § 35.02(c)(1), at 154-55 (referring to "a number
of instances where Congress has provided relief from the navigation servitude"). See
generally NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN WATER LAW
175-96 (1971) (Legal Study No. 5, Frank J. Trelease) (reviewing limitations upon no
compensation rule of navigation servitude). The National Water Commission's final
report to the President and Congress recommended that the no compensation rule
be eliminated and that the United States should pay compensation whenever it
"takes, destroys, or impairs any right acquired under the laws of a State, to the
diversion, storage, or use of any water, in connection with or as the result of any
Federal project for development of navigable or nonnavigable water or for altering
its flow or level." See NATIONAL WATER COMMISSION, WATER POLICIES FOR THE
FUTURE 468-69 (1973) (Recommendation 13-7).
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CONCLUSION
Although the public trust doctrine's detractors and support-
ers may not be able to agree on a single conception of the doc-
trine, they should be able to concur on the principle of equitable
compensation. If one views the doctrine as a bald circumvention
of constitutional protections for private property, compensation
is a step in the direction of fairness. It is one constructive
condition on a grant of trust resources that meliorates another.
If, on the other hand, one sees in the public trust doctrine a long-
standing, common-law rule grounded in the principle that certain
resources are by their very nature public, then compensation for
improvements is a small equitable price to pay for reversing the
improvident natural resource grants of the past. In the final
analysis, if states and courts continue to employ and expand the
public trust doctrine of Illinois Central, however unwise that may
be, they would only compound their error by failing to heed the
whole message of Illinois Central: that where the public trust
doctrine is employed, it necessarily includes equitable compensa-
tion for the grantee.
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